Abstract
In this paper I show that, since 1960, an electoral cycle in US output growth can both be seen by the naked eye in the raw data and confirmed by a statistical analysis that allows for rational partisan effects as well as a wide range of control variables. That is, controlling for multiple lags of interest rate changes, inflation, money growth, energy prices, lagged output growth, government spending (or its growth) and temporary partisan effects, the timing of elections exerts a significant influence on quarterly real GDP growth.
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I thank John Aldrich, John Freeman, Robin Grier, George Krause, Michael Lewis-Beck, John Londregan, Mike Munger, David Soskice, Dan Sutter and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are my responsibility alone.
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Grier, K. US presidential elections and real GDP growth, 1961–2004. Public Choice 135, 337–352 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9266-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9266-6