Abstract
The analysis covers 27 international organizations in the years 1950–2001. From the first to the last year, staff increased at a compound average rate of 3.2% per annum, while the number of member states rose by only 2.5%. The pooled analysis of 817 observations (including task proxies and organization dummies) reveals that (i) the elasticity of staff to membership is much larger than unity (1.36), (ii) United Nations organizations have significantly more staff, (iii) international organizations in the United States and Switzerland have significantly less staff, (iv) heterogeneity in terms of per capita income limits the size of an international organization and that (v) its staff is larger if its membership comprises many industrial or (former) communist countries. In a reduced sample, the financing share of the largest contributor in combination with the party or programmatic orientation of its government has a significantly negative effect on staff because the size of the largest financing share determines the incentive to monitor. U.S. exit from an international organization reduces its staff significantly. Most of these results depend on the condition that the non-stationary component of staff size is not taken account of by time dummies or trends.
Article PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.
References
Alesina, A., Angeloni, I., & Schuknecht, L. (2001). What does the European Union do? Working Paper 8647, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic Studies, 58, 277–297.
Beck, N., & Katz, J. N. (1995). What to do (and not to do) with time-series cross-section data. American Political Science Review, 89, 634–647.
Beer, S. (1973). The modernization of American federalism. Publius, 3, 49–95.
Budge, I., Klingenmann, H.-D., Volkens, A., Bara, J., & Tannenbaum, E. (2001). Mapping policy preferences: estimates for parties, electors, and governments 1945–98. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cooper, R. (1983). Panel discussion. In J. Williamson (Ed.), IMF conditionality (pp. 569–577). Cambridge: Institute for International Economics.
Cusack, T. R. (2004). Data on public employment and wages for 21 OECD countries. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum.
Dreher, A. (2003). The influence of elections on IMF program interruptions. Journal of Development Studies, 39, 101–120.
Dreher, A. (2004). The influence of IMF programs on the re-election of debtor governments. Economics & Politics, 16(1), 53–75.
Dreher, A., & Vaubel, R. (2004). Do IMF and IBRD cause moral hazard and political business cycles? Evidence from panel data. Open Economies Review, 15, 5–22.
Frey, B. S. (1984a). The public choice view of international political economy. International Organization, 38, 199–223.
Frey, B. S. (1984b). International political economics. Oxford: Martin Robertson.
Frey, B. S. (1997). The public choice of international organizations. In D. Mueller (Ed.), Perspectives on public choice (pp. 106–123). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frey, B. S., & Stutzer, A. (2006a). Strenghening the citizens’ role in international organizations. The Review of International Organizations, 1, 27–44.
Frey, B. S., & Stutzer, A. (2006b). Reply to Gordon Tullock. The Review of International Organizations, 1, 47–48.
Hardin, R. (1982). Collective action. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Koremenos, B. (2002, May). Delegation to international organizations. Memo prepared for the Conference on Delegation to International Organizations, Brigham Young University, Utah.
Lyne, M., Nielson, D., & Tierney, M. (2002, Dec.). Principal problems within international organizations. Paper presented at the Harvard Workshop on Delegation to International Organization, Cambridge.
McCubbins, M. D., Noll, R. G., & Weingast, B. R. (1989). Structure and process, politics and policy: Administrative arrangements and the political control of agencies. Virginia Law Review, 75, 431–482.
Migué, J.-L., & Bélanger, G. (1974). Toward a general theory of managerial discretion. Public Choice, 17, 27–43.
Nellor, D. C. (1984). Public bureau budgets and jurisdiction size. Public Choice, 42, 175–183.
Nielson, D. L., & Tierney, M. (2002, April). Principals and interests: Agency theory and multilateral development lending. Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association meeting, Chicago.
Nielson, D. L., & Tierney, M. (2003). Delegation to international organizations: Agency theory and World bank environmental reform. International Organization, 57, 241–276.
Niskanen, W. A. (1971). Bureaucracy and representative government. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Orzechowski, W. (1977). Economic models of bureaucracy: Survey, extensions and evidence. In T. Borcherding (Ed.), Budgets and bureaucrats (pp. 229–259). Durham: Duke University Press.
Parkinson, C. N. (1957). Parkinson’s law, or the pursuit of progress. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Peacock, A. (1983). Public X-inefficiency: Informational and institutional constraints. In H. Hanusch (Ed.), Anatomy of government deficiencies (pp. 125–138). Heidelberg: Springer.
Przeworski, A., & Vreeland, J. R. (2000). The effect of IMF programs on economic growth. Journal of Development Economics, 62, 385–421.
Sandler, T. (1992). Collective action. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Streit, M. E., & Voigt, S. (1996). Toward ever closer union – or ever larger? Or both? Entry to the European Union from the perspective of constitutional economics. In D. Schmidtchen & R. Cooter (Eds.), Constitutional law and economics of the European Union (pp. 223–247). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Tullock, G. (2006). Comment on strengthening the citizens’ role in international organizations by B. S. Frey and A. Stutzer. Review of International Organizations, 1, 45–46.
Vaubel, R. (1986). A public choice approach to international organization. Public Choice, 51, 39–58 (Reprinted and revised in R. Vaubel & T.D. Willett (Eds.), The political economy of international organizations. A public choice approach (pp. 27–45), Boulder: Westview Press).
Vaubel, R. (1991). The political economy of the International Monetary Fund: A public-choice analysis. In R. Vaubel & T.D. Willett (Eds.), The political economy of international organizations. A public choice approach (pp. 204–244). Boulder: Westview Press.
Vaubel, R. (1994). The political economy of centralization and the European community. Public Choice, 81, 151–190.
Vaubel, R. (1995). The centralization of Western Europe. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
Vaubel, R. (1996). Bureaucracy at the IMF and the World Bank. The World Economy, 19, 195–210.
Vaubel, R. (2006). Principal-agent problems in international organizations. Review of International Organizations, 2(1), 125–138.
Vreeland, J. R. (1999). The IMF: Lender of last resort or scapegoat? Yale University.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Vaubel, R., Dreher, A. & Soylu, U. Staff growth in international organizations: A principal-agent problem? An empirical analysis. Public Choice 133, 275–295 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9188-3
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9188-3