Abstract
Contextualist solutions to skeptical puzzles have recently been subjected to various criticisms. In this paper, I will defend contextualism against an objection pressed by Jason Stanley. In the course of doing so, I argue that either semantic context-sensitivity is very widespread in natural language, or else Stanley's ``binding'' test for the presence of hidden variables in logical form is not a good test.
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Neta, R. Contextualism and a puzzle about seeing. Philos Stud 134, 53–63 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9021-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9021-8