Abstract
How should the contrastivist formulate closure? That is, given that knowledge is a ternary contrastive state Kspq (s knows that p rather than q), how does this state extend under entailment? In what follows, I will identify adequacy conditions for closure, criticize the extant invariantist and contextualist closure schemas, and provide a contrastive schema based on the idea of extending answers. I will conclude that only the contrastivist can adequately formulate closure.
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Schaffer, J. Closure, Contrast, and Answer. Philos Stud 133, 233–255 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-4545-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-4545-x