Abstract
A bodily self is characterized by pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness that is “immune to error through misidentification.” To this end, the body's double involvement in consciousness is considered: it can experience objects intentionally and itself non-intentionally. Specifically, pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness, by contrast with the consciousness of the body that happens to be one's own, consists in experiencing one's body as the point of convergence of action and perception. Neither proprioception alone nor intention alone is sufficient to underlie this pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness. Rather, it is made possible thanks to a sensori-motor integration, allowing a sensitivity to the sensory consequences of one's action, through action monitoring.
Article PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.
References
Barbaras, R. 1992. De la phénoménologie du corps à l'ontologie de la chair. In: J. C. Goddard and M. Labrune (eds), Le corps, pp. 242–280. Paris: Vrin.
Bermudez, J. L. 1998. The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Bisiach, E., Rusconi, M. L. and Vallar, G. 1991. Remission of somatoparaphrenic delusion through vestibular stimulation. Neuropsychologia 29: 1029–1031.
Blakemore, S. J., Frith, C. D. and Wolpert, D. M. 1999. Spatio-temporal prediction modulates the perception of self-produced stimuli. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 11: 551–559.
Blakemore, S. J., Wolpert, D. M. and Frith, C. D. 2002. Abnormalities in the awareness of action. Trends in Cognitive Science 6: 237–242.
Blakemore, S. J., Wolpert, D. M. and Frith, C. D. 1998. Central cancellation of self-produced tickle sensation. Nature Neuroscience 1: 635–640.
Brewer, B. 1995. Bodily awareness and the self. In: J. L. Bermudez, A. Marcel, and N. Eilan (eds), The body and the self, pp. 291–309. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Brion, S. and Jednak, C. P. 1972. Troubles du transfer interhémisphérique (callosal disconnection). A propos de trois observations de tumeurs du corps calleux. Le signe de la main étrangère. Revue Neurobiologique 126: 257–266.
Butterworth, G. 1999. A developmental — ecological perspective on Strawson's ‘the self’. In: S. Gallagher and J. Shear (eds), Models of the Self, pp. 203–211. Exeter: Imprint Academic.
Cassam, Q. 1995. Introspection and bodily self-ascription. In: J. L. Bermudez, A. Marcel and N. E. Eilan (eds), The Body and the Self, pp. 311–336. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Castaneda, H. N. 1966. ‘He’: A study in the logic of self-consciousness. Ratio VIII: 130–157. Reprinted in: A. Brook and R. C. De Vidi (eds), 2001. Self-Reference and Self-Awareness, Advances in Consciousness Research, 30, Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publ. Co.
Daprati, E., Franck, N., Georgieff, N., Proust, J., Pacherie, E., Dalery, J. and Jeannerod, M. 1997. Looking for the agent: An investigation into consciousness of action and self-consciousness in schizophrenic patients. Cognition 6: 71–86.
De Vignemont, F. and Fourneret, P. 2004. The sense of agency: a philosophical and empirical review of the “who” system. Consciousness and Cognition 13: 1–19.
Dokic, J. 2003. The sense of ownership: An analogy between sensation and action. In: J. Roessler and N. Eilan (eds), Agency and Self-Awareness, pp. 321–344. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Eilan, N., Marcel, A. and Bermudez, J. L. 1995. Self-consciousness and the body: An interdisciplinary introduction. In: J. L. Bermudez, A. Marcel and N. Eilan (eds), The Body and the Self, pp. 1–28. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Evans G. 1982. Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Farrer, C., Franck, N., Paillard, J. and Jeannerod, M. 2003. The role of proprioception in action recognition. Consciousness and Cognition 12: 609–619.
Fink, G. R., Marshall, J. C., Halligan, P. W., Frith, C. D., Driver, J., Frackowiak, R. S. and Dolan, R. J. 1999. The neural consequences of conflict between intention and the senses. Brain 122(Pt 3): 497–512.
Fourneret, P. and Jeannerod, M. 1998. Limited conscious monitoring of motor performance in normal subjects. Neuropsychologia 36: 1133–1140.
Fourneret, P., Paillard, J., Lamarre, Y., Cole, J. and Jeannerod, M. 2002. Lack of conscious knowledge about one's own actions in a haptically deafferented patient. Neuroreport 13(4): 541–547.
Franck, N., Farrer, C., Georgieff, N., Marie-Cardine, M., Daléry, J., D'Amato, T. and Jeannerod, M. 2001. Defective recognition of one's own actions in schizophrenic patients. American Journal of Psychiatry 158(3): 454–459.
Frith, C. 1996. Neuropsycholgie cognitive de la schizophrénie. Paris: PUF.
Frith, C. D., Blakemore, S. J. and Wolpert, D. M. 2000. Abnormalities in the awareness and control of action. Philosophical Transplantation R Socialis London B Biological Science 355(1404): 1771–1788.
Gallagher, S. 2003. Bodily self-awareness and object-perception. Theoria et Historia Scientiarum: International Journal for Interdisciplinary Studies 7(1): 53–68.
Gallagher, S. 1999. Self-reference and schizophrenia: A cognitive model of immunity to error through misidentification. In: D. Zahavi and J. Parnas (eds), Problems of the Self. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Gallagher, S. 1995. Body schema and intentionality. In: J. L. Bermudez, A. Marcel and N. Eilan (eds), The Body and the Self, pp. 225–244. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Gallagher, S. 1986. Lived body and environment. Research in Phenomenology 16: 139–170.
Gallagher, S. and Marcel, A. J. 1999. The self in contextualized action. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6: 273–300.
Gibson, J. J. 1979. The ecological approach to visual perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Grammont, F., Legrand, D. and Livet, P. (eds). Forthcoming. Naturalizing Intention in Action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Haggard, P. and Clark, S. 2003. Intentional action: Conscious experience and neural prediction. Consciousness and Cognition 12: 695–707.
Head, H. and Holmes, G. 1911–1912. Sensory disturbances from cerebral lesions. Brain 34: 102–245.
Henry, M. 1963. L'essence de la manifestation. Paris: PUF.
Legrand, D. 2004. Problèmes de la Constitution du soi. Thèse de Doctorat en Philosophie de l'Université Aix- Marseille I.
Legrand, D. 2003. How not to find the neural signature of self-consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 12: 544–546.
Leube, D. T., Knoblich, G., Erb, M. and Kircher, T. J. 2003. Observing one's hand become anarchic: An fMRI study of action identification. Consciousness and Cognition 12: 597–608.
Livet, P. 1997. Modèles de la motricité et théorie de l'action. In: J. L. E. Petit (ed), Les neurosciences et la philosophie de l'action, pp. 341–361. Paris: Vrin.
Maine de Biran. 1804. Mémoire sur la décomposition de la pensée. Paris: Vrin (éd. F. Azouvi, 1988).
Marcel, A. 2003. The sense of agency: awareness and ownership of action. In: J. Roessler and N. Eilan (eds), Agency and Self-Awareness, pp. 48–93. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Martin, M. G. F. (1995). Bodily awareness: A sense of ownership. In: J. L. Bermudez, A. Marcel and N. Eilan (eds), The Body and the Self, pp. 267–289. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Merleau-Ponty, M. 1945. Phénoménologie de la perception. Paris: Tel Gallimard.
Milner, A. D. and Goodale, M. A. 1995. The Visual Brain in Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Newen, A. and Vogeley, K. 2003. Self-representation: searching for a neural signature of self-consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 12: 529–543.
Paillard, J. 1999. Body schema and body image: A double dissociation in deafferented patients. In: G. N. Gantchev, S. Mori, and J. Massion (eds), Motor Control, Today and Tomorrow, pp. 197–214. Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. Sofia: Academic Publishing House.
Paillard, J. 1980. Le corps situé et le corps identifié. Une approche psychophysiologique de la notion de schéma corporel. Rev. Méd. Suisse Romande 100: 129–141.
Paillard, J., Michel, F. and Stelmach, G. 1983. Localization without content. A tactile analogue of ‘blind sight’. Archives Neurologica 40: 548–551.
Perry, J. 1998. Myself and I. In: M. Stamm (ed.), Philosophie in synthetisher Absicht, pp. 83–103. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
Perry, J. 1993. The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays. New York: Oxford University Press.
Proust, J. 2003. Perceiving intentions. In: J. Roessler and N. Eilan (eds), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: OUP.
Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Gallese, V. and Fogassi, L. 1996. Premotor cortex and the recognition of motor actions. Brain Research Cognition Brain Research 3: 131–141.
Rochat, P. and Hespos, S. J. 1997. Differential rooting response by neonates: Evidence for an early sense of self. Early Development and Parenting 6(2): 1501–1508.
Rochat, P. and Striano, T. 2000. Pereived self in infancy. Infant Behavior and Development 23: 513–530.
Roll, J. P. and Roll, R. 1993. Le sentiment d'incarnation: Arguments neurobiologiques. Revue de Médecine Psychosomatique 35: 75–90.
Russell, J. 1995. At two with nature: agency and the development of self-world dualism. In: J. L. Bermudez, A. Marcel and N. Eilan (eds), The Body and the Self, pp. 127–151. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Shoemaker, S. 1996. On knowing one's own mind. In: S. Shoemaker (ed.), The First Person Perspective and Other Essays, pp. 25–49. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shoemaker, S. 1986. Introspection and the self. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, X, 101–120.
Shoemaker, S. 1984. Personal identity: a materialist's account. In: S. Shoemaker and R. Swinburne (eds), Personal Identity. Oxford Basil Blackwell.
Shoemaker, S. 1968. Self-reference and self-awareness. Journal of Philosophy 65: 555–567.
Tsakiris, M. and Haggard, P. 2005. Experimenting with the acting self. Cognitive Neuropsychology 22(3/4): 387–407.
Tsakiris, M. and Haggard, P. 2003. Awareness of somatic events associated with a voluntary action. Experimental Brain Research 149(4): 439–446.
Von Holst, E. 1954. Relations between the central nervous system and the peripheral organs. The British Journal of Animal Behavior 2: 89–94.
Weiskrantz, L., Elliot, J. and Darlington, C. 1971. Preliminary observations of tickling oneself. Nature 230: 598–599.
Wittgenstein, L. 1958. Preliminary Studies for the “Philosophical Investigations”. Blue and Brown Books. Paris: Gallimard (1996).
Wolpert, D. M., Ghahramani, Z. and Jordan, M. I. 1995. An internal model for sensorimotor integration. Science 269: 1880–1882.
Zahavi, D. 2003. Phenomenology of self. In: T. Kircher and A. David (eds), The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zahavi, D. and Parnas, J. 1999. Phenomenal consciousness and self-awareness: A phenomenological critique of representational theory. In: S. Gallagher and J. Shear (eds), Models of the Self, pp. 253–270. Exeter: Imprint Academic.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Legrand, D. The Bodily Self: The Sensori-Motor Roots of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness. Phenom Cogn Sci 5, 89–118 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-005-9015-6
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-005-9015-6