Introduction

Like most other nations in the world, Canada has always recognized the importance of exercising ‘soft power’ (Nye 2005; Watanabe and McConnell 2008) through avenues such as international cultural relations, to promote its political, economic and cultural interests (Fraser 1965; Saul n.d.); however, it is the level and nature of its investment and its programmatic approaches that makes Canada distinct. Undoubtedly, each country’s approach to international cultural relations has developed in context in context of its unique cultural values, historical and political context, economic development, and its knowledge traditions (Hayhoe 1989), while at the same time being shaped by international events and the changing dynamics of international power relations (Altbach and Peterson 2008; Altbach 1985, 2004).

International Academic Relations (Hayhoe 1989) were initially established post world war-2 and had a clearly political and cultural mandate to increase international understanding and collaboration. Canada also established its international portfolio during this period primarily to distinguish itself from Great Britain and establish its unique role as a non-colonial, middle power, seeing itself neither as “center” or “periphery” in the world stage (Altbach 1985). However, unlike most other countries, it chose not to establish a centralized organization such as the United States Information Agency, UK’s, British Council, German’s DAAD and Goethe Institutes, EduFrance and the network of Alliance Française, The Netherlands’s NUFFIC, or the Japan Foundation. (Joyal 1994) dedicated to international education. Instead, firmly rooting the task of international diplomacy within its department of foreign affairs, it chose a narrower approach to international academic relations (ICR) by developing a “Canadian Studies Program” and deeper approach to international diplomacy through a committed international development assistance program (ODA). Both these avenues led to distinctly different levels of funding, programmatic approaches, and opportunities for engagement with the academic communities, and could be considered the hallmarks of Canadian international education, albeit in relatively distinct ways.

This paper explores the history of the Canadian federal government’s engagement in overseas development assistance (ODA) and international cultural relations (ICR) in context of international education, and seeks to understand how the rationale and approaches of these policy areas impacted the internationalization of Canadian universities. As the paper will cover the time period from the mid 1960s to 2008, it will reveal the changing contexts of international diplomatic relations, where from an earlier ‘political’ and ‘cultural’ rationale, international education has been taking on a more ‘economic’ focus, post cold war and in response to increased globalization, changing the earlier dynamics of “center” and “periphery” and Canada’s position as middle-power (Knight 1995, 2004; de Wit 1995; Altbach 1985). Through this discussion, the paper not only highlights the contributions and challenges of Canadian foreign policy to the internationalization of Canadian higher education, but also underscores the characteristics of the Canadian federal government’s role in higher education policy making, and in particular, its relations with academics and the university community. In this manner, it aims to contribute to broader research and policy discussions on the internationalization of higher education.

History of policy development

The Canadian Department of External Affairs (DEA) was first created in 1909 and has the primary responsibility for the promotion and protection of Canada’s interests abroad and the conduct of Canada’s relations with other countries.Footnote 1 Prior to the 1960s, Canadian international development assistance was much more closely tied to Canada’s foreign policy; however, both international development assistance and international academic relations policy areas were developed by the Canadian government in the 1960s.

The development of overseas development assistance

The External Aid Office in Canada was initially started in 1960 as part of DFAIT, then Department of External Affairs (DEA). As part of the Commonwealth Colombo Plan, development assistance became an important component of Canada’s foreign policy as an expression of what Cranford Pratt has called, “humane internationalism”—“an acceptance that the citizens and governments of the industrialized world have ethical responsibilities towards those beyond their borders who are suffering severely and who live in abject poverty.” (Morrison 1998, p. 2). These values fit well with Canada’s heritage as a non-colonial middle power.

The importance of ODA was further strengthened through the creation of a separate government agency from DFAIT, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), in 1986. It “symbolized a [further] commitment that led to expansion of the aid program to most parts of the developing world, making Canada one of the more generous donors among industrialized countries.”(Morrison 1998, p. 1). Through the 1960s and 1970s, Canada rapidly increased its expenditure on ODA, reaching its highest level as a percentage of GDP (0.55%) in 1975.Footnote 2

However, beginning in the late 1970s and into the 1980s, Canadian ODA budget began to experience severe cuts. Between 1980 and 1998, the percentage of GDP that Canada devoted to development assistance fell by a third, to 0.29%, leaving it in 11th place internationally (Pratt 1996; Morrison 1998). By 2001, the Canadian percentage had fallen even further, to 0.22%, although by 2005 it had risen again, to 0.34%. Recognizing this shortfall in Canadian foreign policy, the 2005 International Policy Statement (IPS), the latest of the foreign policy reviews under the liberal government, called for an increase in aid funding by 8% each year, which would in effect result in a doubling of assistance from 2001 to 2010. The Conservative government elected in 2006 has expressed its intent to honor this increase, however, in spite of the recent increase in its budget from C$2.6 billion in 2000–2001 to C$4.1 billion in 2004–2005, when expressed as a percentage of GNP, the Canadian share has shrunk in size over the years, and is, “far off course to reach its stated goal of 0.7%, announced in 1970 and reiterated countless times since then.” (Brown 2008, p. 180; Canada, International Policy Statement, Development 2005b; Trilokekar and Shubert 2009).Footnote 3

These dramatic changes in commitment to development aid are largely seen as a reflection of broader changes in Canadian foreign policy that have over the years moved development assistance from its focus on poverty reduction to increased alignment with Canada’s security, diplomatic and commercial interests. In fact, Canadian development policy is severely criticized for being tied, “43% of Canadian bilateral aid in 2004 was tied to the purchase of Canadian goods and services, in sharp contrast to an 8% average for all OECD countries, with Norway, the United Kingdom, and Sweden effectively at zero.” (Goldfarb and Tapp 2006, p. 18). Tied aid is proven to be less effective and more expensive. Thus, not only is Canadian ODA declining in quantity, its quality and effectiveness has been questioned (Brown 2008; Goldfarb and Tapp 2006). CIDA is considered to be a highly centralized bureaucracy, staff and administrative heavy, and closed to feedback and debate form external sources. Its policies have been criticized on several grounds that effectively reduce CIDA’s autonomy and capacity to fight poverty and actually promote development (Morrison 1998; Brown 2008; Goldfarb and Tapp 2006).Footnote 4

The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) was established by the government of Canada as a Crown corporation in 1970 to work in close collaboration with researchers from the developing world (IDRC 2008). The relationship between IDRC and CIDA is, however, tenuous. IDRC is not formally linked to CIDA, although CIDA’s president does sit on the IDRC board. Yet, “…[IDRC] does not tend to fund research based on CIDA priorities or related to the effectiveness of CIDA aid programs, nor is most CIDA programming based on IDRC investments. None of the comparator countries have a research agency like IDRC that is entirely separate from the same country’s aid agency and with a different mandate” (Goldfarb and Tapp 2006, pp. 15–16). Simialrly, CIDA’s relationship with other federal departments, in particular DFAIT, has also been criticized. Although DFAIT and CIDA now have independent reporting structures, DFAIT is considered the more influential department in relation to CIDA in determining its policies, with CIDA basically remaining a “policy taker” throughout its 34 years of existence” (Pestieau and Tait 2004, p. 123).Footnote 5

The development of international cultural relations

The Academic Relations Section was established in 1967 by the Department of External Affairs (DEA) within its then Information Division. Its creation was a response to internal criticisms of its foreign policy by Canadian academics, who, “sympathetic to the left and increasingly politicized by such contentious issues as the American war in Vietnam and growing US investment in Canada openly challenged Canadian foreign policy and those who ran it” (DFAIT, The Department in History, 2005). Unlike its counterparts in other countries, the Academic Relations Section did not initially have an international mandate.Footnote 6 It was only in the mid 1970s, when the Information Division was amalgamated under a new International Cultural Relations Bureau, that the Academic Relations Section was asked, “to develop an informed awareness and a more balanced understanding of Canada… and to facilitate the development of more productive contacts and cross fertilization between Canadian and foreign scholars”, (Graham 1976, n.p., 1999) in order to achieve the Government’s interest in the promotion of Canadian culture and in cultural diplomacy.

In the mid 1970s, the Academic Relations Section became a full fledged division with a mandate to coordinate the following programs: Canadian studies abroad, the Government of Canada (GOC) awards program, academic exchanges, international education and a small domestic program in Canada. The Canadian Studies Program Abroad (CSPA) became the primary program focus of the academic relations division, as it appealed to senior officials as a useful and effective tool to project Canada’s image abroad and raise its profile among the decision makers of foreign countries. The CSPA helped align the mandate of the Division more closely to the Department’s foreign policy objectives. The program was also perceived as a less direct and intrusive approach, as it did not challenge provincial jurisdictional authority over education nor institutional autonomy or academic freedom of Canada universities and academics. Thus, the CSPA came to be the core program of the International Academic Relations Division, its raison d’être (Trilokekar 2007).

The interest in ICR as a foreign policy objective within the Canadian federal government during the 1970s and 1980s, resulted in increased funding, and the Division expanded the CSPA to a larger number of countries. In the mid 1980s, the budget for academic relations reached its highest peak, with approximately $ 20 million as operational funds. However, this situation changed dramatically in the early 1990s, a period marked by austerity and severe budget cuts. In 2002–2003, the total budget for academic relations had gone down to $12 million (Trilokekar 2007). This was a surprise as the 1995 foreign policy review was the first to formally recognize ICR as a third pillar in Canada’s foreign policy objectives (Canada in the World 1995; Saul n.d.). Within foreign policy, while the federal government acknowledged the importance of ICR, unlike the case of ODA, Canada’s investment in academic and cultural relations has always been extremely weak.Footnote 7 Cultural diplomacy in Canadian government’s foreign policy is considered more an “after business hours (initiative) not as part of an overall policy (direction)” (Cohen 2003).

The integration of commercial interests in Canadian foreign policy has influenced ICR, as it has ODA. DFAIT’s ICR programs, like the CSPA, began to be assessed largely in terms of the dollar investments they brought in and their direct influence on Canada’s trade relations. There was also a growing interest in the marketing of Canadian higher education and the recruitment of international students and the Department was given one additional staff person to manage the, “marketing of educational services.” (Joyal 1994). The term ‘internationalization of higher education’ came into common use by the Department during this period and was included as part of the agenda on “Commerce” in the 2005 IPS, foreign policy review (Canada, International Policy Statement, Commerce 2005a).

The literature on the internationalization of Canadian higher education is critical of DFAIT for not coordinating a national policy strategy or initiating a national flagship program in international education. However, this has not been the case. In 1994, DFAIT coordinated a policy paper titled, ‘The International Dimension of Higher Education in Canada: Collaborative Policy Framework’ following extensive interdepartmental consultations as well as consultations with various constituencies and the provinces (DFAIT 1994). However, DFAIT has always faced challenges in coordinating its role in ICR from both internal and external sources. Internally, it has faced challenges from divisions within DFAIT such as the geographic or regional desks and other federal government departments such as CIDA and Human Resources and Skills Development, Canada (HRSDC), with whom it often overlaps responsibilities. Externally, its mandate is challenged by the provinces, and in particular the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada (CMEC), who question its authority in coordinating any pan-Canada education related matters. The Division has found it easier to coordinate and implement initiatives such as the CSPA that do not conflict with the agendas of other federal departments and/or the provincial jurisdictional authority over education. DFAIT’s coordination role in international education may be recognized by Canadian universities, national organizations such as the Association of Universities and Colleges in Canada (AUCC) and the federal government itself. But this role has no formal structure or policy making mechanisms to influence international education policy. The Department’s own lack of commitment to ICR further restricts its ability to use funding mechanisms to initiate or steer any large scale national international educational initiatives.

Impact on university internationalization initiatives

The different historical roots of international development and international academic relations policies within the government of Canada influenced the nature of programs, the level of funding and thus their impact on the university internationalization initiatives. These influences also changed over time as the policy directives in both areas shifted, in this case, to a focus on economic imperatives within Canada’s foreign policy.

The impact of overseas development assistance on universities

Overseas development assistance is considered to be the foundational feature of Canadian internationalization. Beginning in the 1950s, and growing in the 1960s, the two major formative strands of internationalization in Canadian universities are considered to be development cooperation and international students (Bond and Lemasson 1999). Walmsey suggests, that as a result of ODA, “Canadian academics found themselves involved internationally more or less in spite of themselves…” (Walmsey 1970, p. 3) resulting in a series of recommendations to promote university internationalization at the institutional level, all related largely to ODA links.

The first university contract was funded by the External Aid Office within DFAIT in 1961 and was coordinated by the University of British Columbia. Several such twinning programs were established with Canadian universities providing technical assistance to upgrade partner universities in the developing world, with most projects in the applied technical and professional fields. Shute states that “this level of international activity, which was new to Canadian universities, would have been impossible without the financial support of the External Aid Office and later CIDA.” (Bond and Lemasson 1999, p. 25). The growth in CIDA’s ODA envelope during this period directly resulted in increased international activity on Canadian campuses. The first international office on a Canadian campus, at the University of Guelph, was established in 1967. The educational sector deployed the largest number of technical assistance personnel throughout the 1970s to several recipient countries.

Initially, most universities participated in CIDA projects as executing agencies in its bilateral program, however, in 1978, CIDA established a mechanism to specifically support Canadian university and college linkages through the Educational Institutions Program (EIP). In 1979, a total of 37 Canadian universities were participating in CIDA funded projects (Bond and Lemasson 1999; Morrison 1998). In 1980, EIP was incorporated into the newly established Institutional Cooperation and Development Services (ICDS) Division within its Special Programmes Branch, and in 1989/1990 the highest number of university projects, approximately 200 were recorded. In 1992, CIDA’s budget for institutional partnerships had reached $30 million and a program review established yet another program structure. In 1994 the University Partnership Cooperation and Development (UPCD) was launched under CIDA’s Canadian Partnership Branch. The UPCD was designed as a two tier program and is considered the most visible element of CIDA’s relations with universities.Footnote 8 As per AUCC’s statistics, a total of 2600 international development cooperation projects have been implemented between Canadian and southern universities since the 1970s, reflective of the almost four decades of CIDA-institutional partnership (AUCC 2007a, b).

Among the more recent CIDA initiatives that engage the university sector include 400 International Youth Internships (IYIP) started earlier in 1997, as part of the Canadian government’s youth employment strategy. The Canada Corps University Partnership Program, now known as Students for Development is yet another initiative developed as part of Canada’s new 2005 (IPS), which eventually manifested itself in the Canada Corps Student Internships and the Canada Corps University Teams Partnership Program. Canada Corps is funded by CIDA (~2 million/year) and administered by the AUCC. The University Teams component has now been eliminated and approximately 138 student internships are offered through this program (CIDA 2007).

Canadian International Development Agency’s central role in the relationship between Canadian ODA policy and Canadian universities is widely recognized (Pestieau and Tait 2004; Bond and Lemasson 1999; Angeles and Boothroyd 2003; Trilokekar and Shubert 2009) although there has not been a systematic study of this relationship, with the exception of the study commissioned by CIDA and AUCC and conducted by Walmsey in the 1970s (Bond and Lemasson 1999; Angeles and Boothroyd 2003). There is general consensus that the impact of ODA on Canadian universities has been both broad and deep.Footnote 9 The 2006 AUCC report on internationalization suggests CIDA remains the primary source of funding for Canadian university engagement in international development cooperation overseas, with two-thirds receiving their funds from CIDA (AUCC 2007a, b; Knight 2000). On closer examination, however, the relationship between CIDA and Canadian universities has been challenging and fraught with misunderstandings. Given that university overseas projects with the developing world largely depended on CIDA/ODA budgets, both the nature of partnership arrangements and the countries with which these partnerships were developed, mirrored CIDA policy priorities. This became problematic as CIDA policies shifted from university based linkages to more direct commercially oriented programming. This meant fewer funding opportunities for traditional development projects that interested the university community, and a shift to projects that met DFAIT’s political and commercial interests, such as those focused on building relations with emerging economies such as India and China. Institutions are receiving one-third less funding from CIDA than in 1979 and are now seeking new funding partners for development assistance from the private sector and the system of international financial institutions (IFI) (Bond and Lemasson 1999; AUCC 2008). This is bringing in a new culture of more narrow and market driven commercial motivations in university international activities with the South, a move away from projects with countries in most needs of ODA and a parallel “rise of a new development industry.” (Angeles and Boothroyd 2003; AUCC Recognition and Reward 2008; Jackson 2003).

Both CIDA and participating universities have had difficulty negotiating each other’s organizational cultures. University faculty express their discontent with the more bureaucratic interference and reporting structures that have been put in place by CIDA since the mid 1980s. A lack of incentives to encourage faculty participation in CIDA programs is identified as one of the most important challenges in strengthening CIDA-institutional relations (Bond and Lemasson 1999; AUCC Recognition and Reward 2008; Jackson 2003).Footnote 10 A lack of interest and emphasis on research in CIDA programs is considered a major detriment for faculty engagement.Footnote 11 CIDA’s recognition of the contribution of academics to ODA is often questioned, “No one in CIDA has ever shown any interest, even in CIDA-funded work” (Pestieau and Tait 2004, p. 129). Faculty report that they have more opportunities to present their work to Canadian NGO’s then to CIDA, clearly indicating a lack of regular and systematic interaction between Canadian researchers and CIDA. “I find that CIDA and other Canadian agencies have not made any conscious attempt to link themselves with the academic community” (Pestieau and Tait 2004, p. 130).

With the decrease in ODA funding, the relative importance of international development activities to the internationalization of Canadian universities is considered to be declining. Shute observes that, “too few senior administrators view development cooperation as an integral part of internationalization, despite the fact that so much internationalization has arisen directly from university relations with the South (Bond and Lemasson 1999, p. 38). Paradoxically, this is taking place at the same time as there is growing interest among students and faculty in global issues. As Shute suggests, “it may be naïve to assume universities enjoy more than marginal support from CIDA or figure as important in Canada’s ODA”, (Bond and Lemasson 1999, p. 39) but clearly there is indication of missed opportunity and a need to find better communication mechanisms between CIDA and the universities.

The impact of international cultural relations on universities

One would be hard pressed to identify a direct impact of ICR policy on Canadian university international initiatives and accord the same importance to ICR, as given to ODA, in establishing internationalization on Canadian campuses. Certainly the International Academic Relations Division within DFAIT has engaged in the internationalization of higher education in one form or another, albeit its specific role and mandate as it related to Canadian institutions changed dramatically over time, distancing it further in most instances, from any direct institutional contact or cooperation.

As stated earlier, the Division was first established with a specific mandate of working with the Canadian academic community. In policy and program development, it looked primarily to the US State Department model and adapted several of its program initiatives.Footnote 12 Eventually, however, the Department avoided any other large-scale initiatives in higher education. This is because direct or indirect federal support for academic programs and research in international affairs was considered inappropriate within a Canadian context. At one level, there were concerns that direct government involvement in academic matters would interfere with the principles of institutional autonomy and academic freedom. At another level, there were concerns about intruding on policy areas within provincial jurisdiction. At yet another level, the government was cautious of establishing a policy of providing financial support on the scale provided by the US State Department. Given the lack of investment in any of the possible initiatives, the Division missed its opportunity to create the impact that Knight defines as internationalization: “integrating international/intercultural dimension into the teaching, research and service elements of an institution.” (Knight 1995, 2000).

In the mid 1970s with the establishment of the CSPA, the DEA sponsored the visits of a few Canadian scholars to initiate new program developments as well as to be guest lecturers or seminar discussants in target developed countries (Trilokekar 2007). Over time, however, the Department changed its policy orientation and focused on supporting travel/study grants to foreign academics to develop the teaching of Canada. It avoided the ‘straight export of Canadian content’ through pre-packaged teaching materials from Canada in the hope of developing indigenous resources, reducing overall program costs, and avoiding, ‘Canadian cultural imperialism’ (Trilokekar 2007). The Department also prioritized the development of teaching, rather than research in Canadian studies. As a direct result of these policy measures, the Division reduced its support to Canadian academics.

Canadian academics were highly critical of this approach and argued for symmetry in ICR, stating that a domestic program, developing knowledge of other countries in Canada, was needed along with the current program of developing knowledge about Canada abroad. In spite of these expressed interests, the Division clearly separated its mandate in promoting foreign policy from enhancing internationalization within the Canadian higher education community. By the late 1970s, the division’s earlier role of working with the Canadian academic community had disappeared, and the department’s interest in supporting area studies and international study programs had also dissipated. The domestic program responsibility belonged to only one staff person within a division of 13 staff. The Division maintained minimal contact with Canadian universities and academics in order to coordinate binational educational exchange scholarships, including the Commonwealth Fellowship & Scholarship Program (CFSP) which was transferred from CIDA to DFAIT. The total numbers for each of these scholarships across the Canadian higher educational sector was relatively small, 78 Government of Canada awards in 1991–1992 and a few hundred Commonwealth awards (Trilokekar 2007). These reduced numbers translated into fewer international scholarship opportunities for Canadian students, as these programs were developed by DFAIT on a reciprocal basis.

The Division was sensitive to the growing discontent to its program approaches within the domestic academic community. In its opinion, the CSPA was contributing to the internationalization of Canadian universities in its own way, through “fostering student and professional exchanges and university to university linkages” (Trilokekar 2007, p. 227).Footnote 13 Yet, from the perspective of Canadian academics, the exact role of the CSPA and the international academic relations division in serving the Canadian academic community remained vague. On the whole, Canadian academics agreed that DFAIT’s approach was “wrong headed” and appalling in supporting foreign scholars with Canadian tax dollars, particularly in the absence of support for Canadian scholars and students wishing to study abroad. The Department was urged to reconsider its policies concerning academic funding. However, rather than realign its policy and program priorities to meet the needs of Canadian academics, the Division became cautious of its communication strategy, “the normal procedure of announcing grant recipients could be detrimental since the majority of funds are awarded to foreigners; it could generate a backlash on the part of the Canadian academic community, viewing itself in need of the money that was being awarded to foreigners” (Trilokekar 2007, p. 227).

The alignment of both international and domestic interests within DFAIT came about in the 1990s, as a result of a growing interest in the “global knowledge economy”, and the Government of Canada’s initiatives related to a prosperity and learning agenda. The division began referring to its mandate as “intermestic” (Greenshields 2006) deviating from its earlier stance of maintaining a separation between domestic and international ICR objectives. In its policy paper on the international dimensions of higher education, DFAIT recommended a five point strategy that built on the growing importance of higher education to the new economy. To address these primary interests, the Department hosted two conferences with several stakeholder groups, an international symposium on North American collaboration and a national conference on international marketing of higher education.

The outcomes of these new policy directives changed the landscape of the federal government’s involvement in international education. In 1995, an agreement was negotiated between DFAIT, CIDA, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) and the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (APFC) and international marketing activities were initiated through the Canadian Educational Centers (CEC), a fully owned legal entity of APFC. A 5 year plan was developed and eight CEC were established; four centers in the developed world (Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore) were supported by DFAIT and four centers in the developing world (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and India) were supported by CIDA (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada 2008; Trilokekar 2007). Canadian institutions were critical of the CECN funding model based on partial recovery of the centers’ operating costs using the subscription and service fees that the CECN collected from educational institutions. From the government’s perspective, the project model stimulated an entrepreneurial approach at the very early stages of this enterprise, however, from the perspective of Canadian universities, the federal government was not fulfilling its obligations.Footnote 14

In 1998, convinced of the importance of educational marketing, Sergio Marchi, Minister of International Trade, organized a roundtable which resulted in the creation of an educational marketing unit within the Department, “a one stop shopping for education promotion” (Trilokekar 2007).Footnote 15 The marketing unit within DFAIT has been maintained, however, beginning 2001, the government withdrew its support to the CECN’s, who now operate as fully private, independent non-profit companies in approximately 18 countries. As a new boost to educational marketing in 2007, the Federal budget allocated a total of $2 million to DFAIT over 2 years to develop an Education Brand for Canada. DFAIT engaged in extensive consultations with the provincial governments and federal departments through the Federal-Provincial Consultative Committee on Education-Related International Activities (FPCCERIA) and requested input from various stakeholder groups, including the university sector (DFAIT Branding Initiative Background 2008; Tamburri 2008). The outcome of this initiative was not known during the time this paper was written.

Under the rubric of economic competitiveness, student mobility was another area that received increasing attention. DFAIT supports a reciprocal temporary work permit program with close to 40 countries to cover working holidays; student work abroad programs; international co-op placements; and young professional/young worker opportunities (DFAIT 2008). The two major federal international mobility programs (IAMs) are, however, funded not by DFAIT, but the Department of Human Resources and Skills Development Canada (HRSDC).Footnote 16 Thus, ICR initiatives have increased opportunities for Canadian institutions to internationalize their campuses, albeit in a piecemeal fashion. The overall impact could hardly be considered significant at the institutional and system level, considering the insufficient funding and placement opportunities offered through each of the programs. In comparison, individual provinces and universities have initiated their own larger and more systemic initiatives to internationalize Canadian higher education (Trilokekar et al. 2009).

Policy outcomes: contributions and challenges

What can be said about Canada’s approach to the internationalization of higher education in context of its foreign policy and its policy and programmatic focus on ODA and ICR? Five observations are outlined below. First and foremost, it is important to note that although DFAIT invests far less funding in ICR than CIDA does in ODA related education activities, and that CIDA is an organization with a separate mandate from DFAIT, in reality, CIDA’s ODA mandate is largely influenced by DFAIT’s overall foreign policy orientation. This results in both ODA and ICR programs reflecting an increased emphasis on trade and economic policy in keeping with Canada’s overall foreign policy objectives as observed from the character of institutional international partnerships: the countries with which Canadian universities develop international linkages, the nature of program activities, and the methods of program evaluation and assessment.

Second, at a programmatic level CIDA’s impact has been deeper and broader, precisely because it is a far more generous funder than DFAIT, enabling Canadian universities to engage in large scale, multiyear international projects. Besides offering direct support to Canadian universities for ODA projects, CIDA also provides additional indirect support to international education and research through its funding to IDRC and DFAIT. The funding differentials between ODA and ICR, however, suggest that within Canadian foreign policy, there is stronger priority given to development assistance strategy than to academic and cultural relations. These funding differentials in turn, directly influence the nature of internationalization within Canadian higher education at institutional and system levels as well as the level of dependence of universities on the federal government for ODA and ICR program development.Footnote 17

A third observation is related to the making of international education policy within the Canadian federal context. DFAIT’s inability to create any kind of institutional or system wide impact, may in part, be a reflection of the challenges offered by Canada’s federal structure. While CIDA’s mandate with respect to ODA, and in this context, its direct linkages with Canadian academics and universities to develop related programs, is not seen as a conflict of jurisdictional authority, this is not the case with DFAIT. DFAIT is constantly challenged by CMEC and the provinces in defining its policy role in international education. International education, and more broadly academic and cultural relations, as opposed to international development assistance, is considered a provincial responsibility. Thus, in the absence of a federal ministry for education and a national framework for educational policy, the role of DFAIT in what are considered ‘educational’ issues, and therefore a matter of provincial responsibility, is always questioned. International education represents an intersection of two distinct policy areas, foreign policy and higher education, which, within the Canadian context, results being one of those policy areas that falls between the cracks of federal-provincial and interdepartmental jurisdictions (Trilokekar and Jones 2007).

The last two observations relate to the policy making process in Canada. The Canadian federal structure is described as being highly decentralized and uncoordinated, creating challenges for any kind of policy making (Cameron 1997, 1992). In the context of Canadian foreign policy, both DFAIT and CIDA represent Canada’s complex federal arrangements. Both departments share overlapping responsibilities with each other as well as with several other federal departments. There is very little, if any formal coordination between DFAIT and CIDA, let alone with the other departments with which they overlap responsibilities. These inherent structural limitations within the Canadian context impact the ability of the federal government to influence coherent policy development related to the internationalization of higher education. There is frequent overlap, conflict or contradiction of policy agendas given minimum communication and coordination between departments. This scenario challenges overall policy orientation, implementation and its effectiveness. The recent multi stakeholder initiative to develop an education brand for Canada will be a testament to the Federal government’s ability to work through these limitations.

“Policy network” and the related notion of “policy community” constitute two important elements to the policy making process. Meek et al. (1991, p. 455) suggest that “the articulation of interests by various groups affects policies and their ability (or inability) to shape the future direction of higher education systems”. They contend that the “policy itself should be treated not merely as an officially accepted government directive, but as the resultant of the interplay between the key actors involved on issues relating to the structure, function and character of higher education systems. Policy in this sense incorporates the dynamics that shape a higher education system through the interactions of the various (groups of) actors who can be identified at the different levels within the system; actors who operate from different perspectives, with different ideologies and objectives, and from different power positions” (Meek et al. 1991, p. 455).

The fifth and final point relates to this notion of communities/networks and their influence on the policy making process. In examining the relations between CIDA, DFAIT and Canadian universities, there is one aspect of university-government relations that becomes prominent. In both foreign policy areas, there is mutual skepticism, distrust and a lack of communication between university and governments, with limited input from academics in policy development. Intermediaries such as the AUCC, the International Council of Canadian Studies (ICCS) in the case of the CSPA, work with both the university and the government sectors; however, they seem to function more as administrative arms of government funded initiatives rather than strong communities of policy influence. The virtual absence of academics in the core of ODA policy communities for example, reinforces the sentiment among academics that CIDA does not consider them and their work a valuable resource. DFAIT had established an academic advisory committee in the 1970s, however, this committee eventually got dissolved. Here it is important to note the word advisory, as the Department has always been wary and uneasy of any direct influence of academics on foreign policy matters. Why is this the case in Canada, when in other countries, academics do have a more formal and more established role in government policy development? (Morrison 1998; Goldfarb and Tapp 2006). Does the Canadian government in fact indicate what Pestieau and Tait refer to as an “anti intellectual bias”? (Pestieau and Tait 2004, p. 126). Ironically, the very reason that DFAIT established the academic relations unit in the 1960s was to build better relations with the Canadian academic community! There is a mismatch between government and university policy objectives in ODA and ICR related activities. On the one hand, the Canadian government does not seem to be open to policy input neither is it patient with criticism from the academic community. On the other, a lack of communication also reduces the ability of academics to understand government priorities. It disengages them from a pertinent policy making process. The uneasy tension between government and university cultures is a recurring theme in this policy area; one that needs consideration.

Conclusion

“Internationalization is often confused with globalization…while globalization maybe unalterable, internationalization involves many choices.” (Altbach and Knight 2007, pp. 290–291). Internationalization at Canadian universities predates the euphoria connecting internationalization with globalization and the need for competitiveness in the global knowledge economy. In many ways it is not reactionary, rather its roots are embedded in a traditional Canadian ethos and soft power policy of anti imperialism and a need for a just and equitable world order, best reflected in the Pearsonian foreign policy tradition. Proudly, ODA has been recognized as the foundation of Canadian internationalization making it sufficiently distinct from the more traditional ICR approach adopted by several countries such as the U.S., UK and Germany. However, this is now history.

The contemporary emphasis on free trade and commerce in response to forces of globalization has shifted policy and programmatic priorities within the Canadian context. Foreign policy does not enjoy the same public priority (Brown 2008; Potter 2009) as well higher education is seen as more of a private good within a growing international market for “academic and scientific personnel, curricular internationalization and the commercialization of international higher education…” (Altbach and Knight 2007, p. 291), thus aligning Canada’s policy approaches with those of other jurisdictions such as Australia (Trilokekar 2007). This has altered Canada’s position of maintaining middle power status in the “center” and “periphery” dichotomy to one that embraces globalization and the inherent inequality in creating spaces of “concentration of wealth, knowledge and power” (ibid).

These changes in foreign policy orientation, in addition to Canada’s federal structure, limit federal policy development and coordination on matters concerning international education. But perhaps most importantly, the absence of Canadian academics in government policy communities and policy networks is one of the most serious challenges to improving university-government relations and the robust policy development of internationalization of Canadian higher education. Ironically for a country that established a bold and a unique international vision, one observes an alignment with broader global approaches that result in a narrowing of vision, a focus on more short rather than long term objectives and a limited engagement of dialogue to promote both international development assistance and international cultural (educational) relations, the two foundational pillars of Canada’s international relations, as our nation’s soft power.