Abstract
In this paper, we develop a typology of bargaining steps for multi-issue negotiations, which is derived from possible changes in single issues. By considering all combinations of such changes, we create a consistent classification of steps. This classification forms the basis of an empirical analysis of the impact of different types of bargaining steps on various outcome dimensions of negotiations. We perform an exploratory analysis based on an ex-post analysis of existing negotiation data, which was collected over several years using an Internet-based negotiation support system. Empirical results indicate a strong positive impact of log-rolling strategies and a negative impact of “hard” tactics like insistence on the chances of reaching an agreement. Contrary to expectations, hard tactics do not improve the efficiency of agreements.
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Filzmoser, M., Vetschera, R. A Classification of Bargaining Steps and their Impact on Negotiation Outcomes. Group Decis Negot 17, 421–443 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-008-9106-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-008-9106-1