Abstract
This paper argues that scientific studies distinguish themselves from other studies by a combination of their processes, their (knowledge) elements and the roles of these elements. This is supported by constructing a process model. An illustrative example based on Newtonian mechanics shows how scientific knowledge is structured according to the process model. To distinguish scientific studies from research and scientific research, two additional process models are built for such processes. We apply these process models: (1) to argue that scientific progress should emphasize both the process of change and the content of change; (2) to chart the major stages of scientific study development; and (3) to define “science”.
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Luk, R.W.P. Understanding Scientific Study via Process Modeling. Found Sci 15, 49–78 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-009-9168-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-009-9168-9