Abstract
This paper presents experimental evidence about how effectively individuals learn from information coming from heterogeneous sources. In the experiment, Thai subjects observed information that came from Americans and from other Thais that they could use to help them answer a series of questions. Despite listening too little to either group, subjects demonstrated a significant amount of statistical sophistication in how they weighed observed American information relative to observed Thai information. The data indicate that subjects understood that outside information has extra value because people from the same group tend to make the same kinds of mistakes. The results illustrate the importance of forming diverse groups to solve problems.
Article PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.
References
Anderson, L., & Holt, C. (1997). Information cascades in the laboratory. American Economic Review, 87, 847–862.
Austen-Smith, D., & Banks, J. (1996). Information aggregation, rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem. American Political Science Review, 90, 34–45.
Camerer, C., & Lovallo, D. (1999). Overconfidence and excess entry: an experimental approach. American Economic Review, 89, 306–318.
Duflo, E., & Saez, E. (2003). The role of information and social interactions in retirement plan decisions: evidence from a randomized experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 815–842.
Feddersen, T., & Pesendorfer, W. (1997). Voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information. Econometrica, 65, 1029–1058.
Forsythe, R., & Lundholm, R. (1990). Information aggregation in an experimental market. Econometrica, 58, 309–347.
Foster, A., & Rosenzweig, M. (1995). Learning by doing and learning from others: human capital and technical change in agriculture. Journal of Political Economy, 103, 1176–1209.
Gigerenzer, G., Hoffrage, U., & Kleinbolting, H. (1991). Probabilistic mental models: a Brunswikian theory of confidence. Psychological Review, 98, 506–528.
Goeree, J., Palfrey, T., Rogers, B., & McKelvey, R. (2007). Self-correcting information cascades. Review of Economic Studies, 74, 733–762.
Granovetter, M. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78, 1360–1380.
Hellwig, M. F. (1980). On the aggregation of information in competitive markets. Journal of Economic Theory, 22, 477–498.
Hoelzl, E., & Rustichini, A. (2005). Overconfident: do you put your money on it? Economic Journal, 115, 305–318.
Iyengar, R., & Schotter, A. (2008). Learning under supervision: an experimental study. Experimental Economics, 11, 154–173.
Janis, I. L. (1972). Victims of groupthink: A psychological study of foreign policy decisions and fiascoes. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
Kraemer, C., Noth, M., & Weber, M. (2006). Information aggregation with costly information and random ordering: experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 59, 423–432.
Lohmann, S. (1994). Information aggregation through costly political action. American Economic Review, 84, 518–530.
Miguel, E., & Kremer, M. (2004). Worms: identifying impacts on education and health in the presence of treatment externalities. Econometrica, 72, 159–217.
Munshi, K. (2004). Social learning in a heterogeneous population: technology diffusion in the Indian Green Revolution. Journal of Development Economics, 73, 185–213.
Munshi, K., & Myaux, J. (2006). Social norms and the fertility transition. Journal of Development Economics, 80, 1–38.
Pesendorfer, W., & Swinkels, J. (1997). The loser’s curse and information aggregation in common value auctions. Econometrica, 65, 1247–1281.
Pesendorfer, W., & Swinkels, J. (2000). Efficiency and information aggregation in auctions. American Economic Review, 90, 499–525.
Piketty, T. (1999). The information-aggregation approach to political institutions. European Economic Review, 43, 791–800.
Plott, C., & Sunder, S. (1988). Rational expectations and the aggregation of diverse information in laboratory security markets. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 56, 1085–1118.
Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling alone. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Schotter, A. (2003). Decision making with naive advice. American Economic Review, 93, 196–201.
Schotter, A., & Sopher, B. (2003). Social learning and coordination conventions in intergenerational games: An experimental study. Journal of Political Economy, 111, 498–529.
Schotter, A., & Sopher, B. (2006). Advice and behavior in intergenerational ultimatum games: An experimental approach. Games and Economic Behavior, 58, 365–393.
Surowiecki, J. (2004). The wisdom of crowds. New York: Doubleday.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases. Science, 185, 1124–1131.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Electronic Supplementary Material
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Healy, A. How effectively do people learn from a variety of different opinions?. Exp Econ 12, 386–416 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-009-9220-1
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-009-9220-1