Abstract
This paper studies the influence of productivity, pollution sensitivity, and adaptive capacity on optimal mitigation and adaptation in a two-country global pollution model. We investigate the effects of changes of these parameters on the allocation of emissions, adaptation expenditures, and welfare. In our analysis we distinguish between cooperative and non-cooperative behavior. Our findings imply that unilateral improvements in productivity and adaptive capacity have strategic significance and do not necessarily lead to mutual welfare improvements. They raise the emissions not only in the country where the technological improvement takes place, but also globally. An improvement in global welfare is guaranteed only under cooperative behavior with respect to emission and adaptation choices.
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Ebert, U., Welsch, H. Adaptation and Mitigation in Global Pollution Problems: Economic Impacts of Productivity, Sensitivity, and Adaptive Capacity. Environ Resource Econ 52, 49–64 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9519-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9519-1