Introduction

How people might be encouraged to leave organizations, whether criminal or not, is one of broad interest. Clearly there is considerable worthwhile research dealing with the issue of leaving groups that are not necessarily illegal, but which might be quite unpopular, such as new religious movements (NRMs). This is certainly the case concerning “deprogramming,” a process developed initially in the United States to assist in removing participants from newer religious groups which, although unpopular, were not often defined as illegal. Herein I develop some ideas based on research appertaining to studies of religious groups or movements in various countries, and how people are urged or even forced to disaffiliate from such groups, sometimes even facilitated by officially declaring such groups as criminal in nature.Footnote 1

One relevant line of scholarship derives from research on various religious and political social movements focusing on how and why people join such movements, and one how and why they might choose to leave them after a time. The literature on these topics is huge, although its major focus has been on the initial recruitment phases. However, there has been some important work on the processes involved in leaving such groups and movements, including research that includes discussion of deprogramming [7, 29, 36]. For example, Richardson et al. [29] discuss various ways of leaving new religions, including voluntary exiting, expulsion by the group, and extraction by external agents, the latter of which refers to forced deprogramming. There has also been some relevant research discussing how governments and other social control agents might encourage people to leave unpopular movements, be they political or religious [16]. Some material from this literature will be discussed herein, as it is relevant to the focus of this conference.

Another approach to the conference topic builds on ideas from the sociology of law concerning various ways to implement social control efforts [3]. On one end of a continuum are social control efforts that are completely private and do not involve any assistance from official governmental agencies or personages. These efforts do not require any legal sanction, and indeed they may even contravene laws that exist in the society. Donald Black notes that most social control can be described as “self-help” in that individuals and groups take it upon themselves to punish what are viewed by the group as moral transgressions of one sort or another. Joining an unpopular religious group can be and is sometimes viewed as a transgression that demands a response; thus deprogramming of a private self-help variety has been developed to address this situation. The development of this approach in the United States and its spread to other countries, especially Japan, will be discussed herein to illustrate this approach to deprogramming.

At the other end of the continuum are social control actions that are taken by governments to enforce official views of correct beliefs and behaviors. These official governmental actions, carried out by functionaries of the government, can involve vigorous, even violent, efforts to dissuade people from participating in groups deemed unacceptable to the government. Such effort can be given legal sanction by the passage of laws that make illegal the activities or even the beliefs of the unpopular movement or group being targeted. The case of the suppression of the Falun Gong in China will be used herein to demonstrate this extreme situation.

There also are many instances of deprogramming that fall somewhere in the middle ranges of this continuum. For example, as has been the case with many self-help deprogrammings, the actions of the deprogrammers might actually violate laws and even constitutional protections, and the authorities might be aware of what is happening. However, if the authorities share the values and beliefs of those doing the deprogramming the authorities can choose to ignore the legal violations that are taking place, and they might even assist in some way with what is being done. Thus the line between self-help deprogrammings and those carried out by the governmental agents is sometimes blurred.

Another example of a type of occurrence between the extreme ends of the continuum but toward the “governmental repressive” end might involve situations where governmental agents attempt to exert social control over a movement but do so covertly and out of public awareness. There are many examples of such activities, including some that openly discourage participation, and attempt to convince through various methods that members should withdraw from the group. Gary Marx’s [16] research, which includes some attention to deprogramming from unpopular religious groups, will be used to demonstrate this type of social control sometimes involved in deprogramming social movement participants. These ideal types are presented in Fig. 1.

Fig. 1
figure 1

Four ideal types on continuum of governmental involvement in deprogramming

Full size image

Deprogramming participants in religious groups illustrates all these various possibilities, as there have been a large number of private “self-help” deprogrammings from religious groups over recent decades, including many about which law enforcement and other justice system officials were aware. But there have also been officially sanctioned programs implemented by governments to accomplish a similar goal, such as the massive effort to stamp out the Falun Gong in China over the past decade. Entire new institutions were developed to carry out the wishes of the Chinese government concerning the Falun Gong, and extant institutions such as the mass media were modified in their goals and activities in order to further the goal of controlling the Falun Gong. New statutes and legal practices were developed to justify this effort, including statutes that redefined the movement by making participation illegal.

Herein I will first discuss the deprogramming efforts that are toward the self-help end of the continuum, as those efforts developed first in the United States, but then spread around the Western world. Particularly the use of the self-help approach more recently in Japan will be discussed in some depth. Then I will describe the massive organizational effort to deprogram participants in the Falun Gong movement in China, to demonstrate that deprogramming can be carried out extremely effectively if all the resources of the State are applied to such an undertaking.

History of “Deprogramming” in the United States and beyond

“Deprogramming” is a word coined in the United States in the early 1970s to describe a private, self-help process whereby participants in unpopular new religious movements (NRMs) were forcibly removed from the group, incarcerated, and put through radical resocialization processes that were supposed to result in their agreeing to leave the group. This process was frequently used in the 1970s and early 1980s, resulting in thousands of young adult Americans forced to experience deprogramming.

The word deprogramming itself makes a statement because it implies that those being “treated” through the process have first been “programmed” by some other entity, with the clear implication that the other entity doing the original programming was somehow mistaken, or even worse, evil and destructive. The invention of the word is an excellent illustration of the “politics of representation” battles that have been and are being fought concerning unpopular religious group [10]. The term built upon the significant animus toward “cults” and redefinition of that term that was developed in the United States [23], and meshed well with the claims that such groups “brainwashed” individuals and kept them under “mind control” [2, 21, 24]. Thus a very negative view toward NRMs was developed and promoted in American and elsewhere, and that view became virtually hegemonic, making the approach a powerful social weapon to use in attempts to exert social control over NRMs.

Deprogramming was defined above as “private self-help” because in the United States federal or state governments are limited in how much they can get involved in exerting official control over religious groups. Much can and has been done informally by government officials and agencies, of course, but the First Amendment with its religious freedom and establishment clauses precludes much overt and direct action by governments that might be legal and accepted in many other societies. Thus, the concept of self-help remedies [3] is well-illustrated by the rise in deprogramming in the United States, which developed as a resolution to a perceived problem of many young people joining “cults” against the wishes of their families.

A deprogramming industry developed quickly in America as a result of thousands of young people leaving that usual and expected “social location” to follow other paths of action and belief promoted by NRMs [33]. The demographic make-up of these young people was typically middle class and above and they were relatively well educated. Thus they were from relatively affluent classes whose families had the means to actively pursue them in efforts to get them to return to their usual place in the family of origin and society. The affluence of the classes from whence came most NRM members contributed directly to the development of the deprogramming industry in the United States, and that industry and its practitioners later spread around the world, with deprogrammings occurring in a number of Western countries [29, 34].

The deprogramming industry that developed promoted the definitions of “cult” mentioned above, and the idea that “brainwashing” and “mind control” were used to recruit and retain participants in the religious groups. The industry was part of a larger Anti-Cult Movement (ACM) peopled by various types of individuals, including ex-members who had become disillusioned, some parents who had “lost” children to one of the NRMs, some representatives of organized religion who felt the “cults” were stealing members of their flocks, and, interestingly, even some representatives of the Jewish community (Jewish young people were over-represented in a number of NRMs). A few clinical psychologists, psychiatrists, and even legal scholars played a crucial role in legitimizing the deprogramming movement [30].

The industry involved a number of people who performed deprogrammings or assisted with them. Also, some institutions were developed where people who were kidnapped for deprogramming were sent by their parents who could afford to pay the fees associated with such organizations. Sometimes these deprogrammings occurred under color of law, as some judges for a time granted “conservatorships” to parents, using laws designed to help deal with older family members whose mental faculties had deteriorated [5]. Granting a conservatorship to parents of a young person meant that the parent could legally obtain custody of the person, using law enforcement personnel and procedures, and could then retain custody or place them in a deprogramming facility or other mental health institution. However, these kinds of rulings fell into disfavor after a time, as courts became sensitized to constitutional protections usually afforded American citizens [15, 22]. The 1977 Katz case in California involving members of the Unification Church, was a lead case but there were others.

One crucial characteristic of the process that was just illustrated is that often law enforcement officials and even judges knew about the deprogramming and sanctioned the process, either officially or by turning a “blind eye” to what was happening. Quite often deprogramming was defined by justice officials as a “family matter,” and therefore not subject to intervention by representatives of the justice system, except perhaps to help enforce a conservatorship that had been granted. This view was adopted by the legal system even though usually the young people targeted for deprogramming were of legal age, and the First Amendment of the United States Constitution is supposed to protect religious freedom. Thus thousands of deprogrammings occurred in the United States, and very few ever involved criminal charges against those involved in the deprogrammings, in spite of state and federal laws against such actions.

The deprogramming movement lasted for nearly two decades in America, until a few court decisions, such as a very important Katz case in California changed the legal landscape considerably. This case, which involved some adult members of the Unification Church who were kidnapped and deprogrammed, revealed the legal problems associated with such actions and demonstrated that those engaged in deprogramming might be liable under various laws and constitutions in the United States [2, 5, 15, 31]. Also, there were a number of civil actions that were successful against deprogrammers (and even parents) that caused deprogrammers and those organizations who supported them to have second thoughts about such activities [4]. These court decisions, augmented by a growing awareness that deprogramming contravened important values in American society such as freedom of association and religion, caused a major drop in the number of deprogrammings taking place in America. A shift was made within the industry to adapt to the new legal and public environment, and deprogramming gave way to “exit counseling,” a much less physically coercive process for “rescuing” young people from NRMs.

Estimates are that over half the deprogramming efforts in the United States were “successful” in that the person targeted for the deprogramming did in fact leave their group of membership [6]. But, any time the deprogramming did not succeed in convincing the participant to leave his or her group of membership, this led to difficulties with negative publicity, and some of the court cases alluded to above.

The deprogramming industry and its practitioners did not completely go away, however, and there have been reports over the years of occasional deprogrammings occurring in the United States and in other countries.Footnote 2 The industry has also developed elsewhere, particularly Japan, and has done so with interesting innovations. It is to the Japanese situation that we now turn.

Deprogramming in Japan: self-help with informal official sanction

Deprogramming started about the same time in Japan as it did in America, but it peaked somewhat later in the late 1980s and early to mid-1990s [9, 18]. The peak year was 1992, with 375 recorded deprogrammings occurring [19]. UC sources claim that over 4300 members have been forcibly deprogrammed over the past four decades in Japan, and that deprogrammings are still taking place, with 10 occurring in 2009. The deprogrammings in Japan are quite similar in that they are mostly “private self-help” actions, but also differ in a number of ways from those in the United States, however. If UC reports are to be accepted, some from a claimed 1300 people who have escaped from deprogrammings in Japan, then it appears that deprogrammings may be much longer in duration in Japan than was the case in the United States. There are claims that some of the incarcerations last for years, and are accompanied by intense psychological and physical abuse visited upon the targeted person by deprogrammers and family members.

Perhaps the most striking thing about the deprogrammings in Japan is that they often involve Christian ministers. Apparently some Christian ministers have become convinced that siding with those who would oppose the UC and other minority faiths is the best way for them to gain acceptance and legitimacy in Japan for themselves and their churches. So, a number of these ministers have taken leadership roles in the deprogramming movement within Japan, and some do the actual deprogramming.

Another interesting feature of Japanese deprogramming is the involvement of the Japanese Communist Party. This political party is a force with some strength in Japan, and they run candidates for political office, sometimes winning elections. The strong anti-communist stance that has been adopted by the Unification Church attracted the attention of the JCP, and they have actively sought to assist in controlling if not stamping out the UC completely in Japan. As an example, one JCP newspaper ran over 1700 articles about the UC over several years of the campaign against them.

The Japanese Bar Association also has become actively involved in the anti-UC campaign, with some of its members being quite successful at filing legal actions of various kinds to harass and deter UC activities. These legal actions have resulted in the loss of income for the UC in Japan, and also forced them to pay large fines and restitution when they lose these civil court actions (and they do lose most of them).

As in the United States, it has been difficult to get law enforcement authorities and courts to attend to the issue of the hundreds of deprogrammings that have occurred and are still occurring, albeit at a much lower level in recent years. Prosecutors refuse to bring criminal charges against the ministers and others who have been involved in deprogramming, and judges have been loath to allow civil suits against deprogrammers even if the facts of a given case are egregious. All the authorities seem to share a view that deprogramming is a family matter, and that the family unit is attempting to solve a problem within the family. Only recently have any civil or criminal legal actions been successful, and they are few in number.

One sign of the depth of the problems with deprogramming in Japan is that the U.S. State Department has mentioned the issue in its International Religious Freedom Report every year but one since 1999. The entries are brief, but specifically refer to the problems of UC members being forcibly detained and put through deprogramming, some for long periods of time. These reports were noticed by some members of the Diet in Japan, who called attention to the accusations. Thus the reports have helped contribute to some change of the political climate concerning deprogramming in Japan.

It is worth noting that the information concerning deprogramming of UC members in Japan was called to the attention of the U.S. State Department by representatives of the UC, who decided after decades of frustration to become more aggressive in their effort to educate the Japanese media and the international community about what was happening in Japan concerning forcible efforts to dissuade participation in minority faiths, particularly the UC. These efforts have borne fruit, as evidenced by the State Department reports, and by other international publications [13].

The deprogrammings in Japan have occurred in spite of the fact that Japanese legal documents (constitution and laws) clearly guarantee religious freedom, following a model that is quite Western in orientation. The fact that the UC could be defined as beyond the pale in terms of acceptable religion, that other religious leaders have become leaders in the effort to exert control over the UC, and that the government and law enforcement entities have been involved in the effort (even if somewhat passively) demands some explanation. The explanation seems to be similar in some ways to the reasons for the anti-cult sentiments expressed in the United States and in some other Western nations. And it is worth noting that the American ACM was very active in promoting its view and sending materials to Japanese groups which sought to exert control over the UC.

However, there also are other important elements, with a crucial one being the deep-seated animus toward things Korean by the Japanese. For the son or daughter of a Japanese family to join a new religion headed by a Korean has been difficult for the parents to accept, and the problem is exacerbated by the mass marriages performed by Reverend Moon, which often included matching a Japanese young person with one from Korea. Hundreds of Japanese recruits to the UC also were sent overseas to engage in missionary work in other countries, and funds raised by the UC in Japan and elsewhere were thought to be associated with an extreme right-wing political movement, which is how the UC became defined in Japanese society. This view was also fostered by developments within the United States, such as the Fraser Report done in 1978 for Congress that made such claims, and the active involvement of the UC in defending Richard Nixon during the Watergate crisis because he was defined by the UC as a virulent foe of communism [8].

Deprogramming through covert actions of governmental agents

This section is derived in part from James Richardson [27], which is forthcoming in a volume of conference papers published by Nomos Publishing, Cracow.

Details on how deprogramming in political and religious movements might be facilitated by external pressures can be found in an oft-cited paper by Gary Marx entitled “External efforts to damage or facilitate social movements” [16]. Marx’s ideas help understanding of social control efforts designed to damage the group itself, and discourage participation by individuals. He notes [16: p. 361] that there are several processes that can damage social movements, including application of legal sanctions, which “…can be means to other ends, such as creating an unfavorable public image or destroying leadership.” He talks about public labeling of a movement and its leaders, and covert actions such as releasing private and even false information that promotes a negative image of the group or movement. He also discusses governmental efforts to block group activities, including those designed to engender positive media attention. He describes efforts to limit resources and facilities available to the group, making it harder for them to operate. Tax exempt status may be questioned, and other governmental agencies such as ones dealing with immigration may get involved in control efforts to discourage participation, as well.

One area of special interest to our focus herein concerns governmental actions that have as their goal “derecruitment” of participants, which might be thought of as another term for deprogramming. Derecruitment tactics are designed specifically to discourage participants from continuing to participant. Marx mentions efforts to generate negative publicity about a group as a way to discourage participation. He also describes the tactic of authorities obtaining membership lists, and using them to contact parents and others about those who are participating. Infiltration of movement groups in an effort to disrupt them is another tactic, as are several types of direct confrontation and harassment of members and leaders of movement groups, including even arresting them on trumped up charges. It is easy to understand how these kinds of actions could lead some participants to withdraw from the group.

Marx specifically mentions deprogramming members of the Unification Church of Reverend Sun Myung Moon as one example of derecruitment tactics. The UC was a major target of deprogramming in America during the 1970s and 80s, and is now the major target in Japan, as discussed above. Marx refers to deprogramming as a “private” action, and mentions some other similar activities. He ignores the fact that private actions such a deprogramming often have been done with the full knowledge and even cooperation of authorities, as discussed above. Legal actions against deprogrammers, such as civil actions for false imprisonment or criminal charges of kidnapping have been rare, but when taken the deprogrammers usually are found not guilty or civilly liable, and thus they seemed to operate with impunity, and still do so in Japan. That impunity from legal action demonstrates the power of those trying to exert social control, and that power predictably would discourage participation in movement groups that were being targeted. Marx concludes with a long list of movements and groups that have been attended to since by various arms of the government in efforts to exert control. He includes religious groups among those listed [16: p. 372].

Deprogramming by the State: the case of China

The material from this section is a revision of parts of James T. Richardson and Bryan Edelman [28].

This section will describe how the power of the State can be brought to bear on a dissident group, leading to state sanctioned deprogramming involving the entire institutional and political apparatus of the State.Footnote 5 When the huge resources of a totalitarian state can be brought to bear on a religious or political group, the results can be very effective and dramatic, even if disturbing on moral grounds. What has happened to the Falun Gong in China over the past decade clearly shows that deprogramming can be accomplished on a massive scale against any group, religious or otherwise, which becomes defined as a threat to the government of China. Also, the case of the severe and systematic repression of the Falun Gong may illustrate how a government can use a politically weak group as part of an effort to rejuvenate itself, and motivate its citizens to adhere to party doctrine. This has also occurred to some extent in former Soviet countries, including Russia [32]. Here is what happened in China, which will be our major example of massive state sponsored deprogramming.

On 25 April 1999, over ten thousand Falun Gong adherents gathered in a peaceful “appeal” around Zhong-nanhai, home to the majority of the central governmental leadership in the People’s Republic of China. The protestors wanted the PRC government, many of whose members reside there in the new “forbidden city,” to recognize the movement as a legitimate form of spirituality.Footnote 6

A few months later, on 22 July 1999, the State Council, the executive branch of the central government, officially banned Falun Gong, labeling it an “evil cult,” an act that culminated nearly 3 months of intense preparation, described in great detail by James Tong.Footnote 7 This included a massive intelligence gathering operation to find out more about the Falun Gong, including the names and locations of all leaders across the country. Also, the government was intent on stopping all further demonstrations by the Falun Gong, doing so very effectively throughout the country, and a major propaganda campaign was launched quietly (until July 22) that resulted in a huge outpouring of negative media once the campaign was announced.Footnote 8

The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress then passed ex post facto legislation banning “evil cults” on 30 October 1999, thus making the program of repression technically legal. In the months that followed, the government took several other actions in an effort to exert social control over the Falun Gong movement and to garner support in the international arena. Current reported numbers of those detained, jailed, and committed are even higher. James Tong [35, pp. 122–126] reports the following numbers as of 2009, and says, “These reports appear verifiable”: 14,474 cases of physical torture and psychological abuse, including 4,724 cases of severe physical beatings or other physical trauma such as 1,732 cases involving use of electric shocks, and 2,895 deaths of imprisoned practitioners.

These statistics clearly show that State fostered violence against the Falun Gong has been thorough and effective. Individual practitioners have been dealt with harshly, forcing thousands to recant and withdraw from the movement, and the overall effect of this massive campaign is the near termination of the movement itself in China. The movement has not been totally stamped out in China, but it has been forced underground and it is much smaller than was the case before the state sanctioned deprogramming began.

The top down structure created by China’s ideology of “democratic centralism,” the large number of Party members holding key government positions, coupled with the doctrine of these members adhering to Party policy, gives the central Chinese Communist Party leadership the ability to control most decisions of the state, and brings into serious question the idea of separation of Party and state. The CCP leadership can easily turn Party policy into state policy, as it has demonstrated with Falun Gong. Given the monolithic and unchecked political structure just outlined, the full power of the State could be and was turned on the Falun Gong very quickly and efficiently, as shown by this timeline of official actions taken.

On 22 July 1999, 3 months after the original demonstration at the “forbidden city,” the Ministry of Civil Affairs under the State Council issued a decision banning “the Research Society of Falun Dafa and the Falun Gong organization under its control.” The Ministry of Security issued a notice which prohibited the displaying of “public marks”—signs or advertisements—promoting Falun Dafa, distributing of promotional materials, gathering to perform exercises or promotional activities, and participating in sit-ins, petitions, demonstrations and other activities which oppose the decision to ban the group’s activities.Footnote 9

On 29 August 1999, the General Office of the State Council issued notice no. 77/1999 expanding the ban to other similar qigong groups and activities. It designated such activities as “illegal gatherings” which “endangered public security, disrupted social order and harmed social stability.”Footnote 10 In October 1999, thousands of Falun Gong practitioners went to Beijing after hearing that the PRC parliament would debate a bill to criminalize Falun Gong and other religious groups labeled as “evil cults” by the government [14]. On 30 October 1999, the Standing Committee of the NPC passed a “Decision on Banning Heretical Organizations and Preventing and Punishing Heretical Activities.” This called for a major crackdown on “heretical organizations such as Qigong and other forms.” It has since been applied retroactively to practitioners who engaged in banned activities prior to that date.Footnote 11

On the same day, the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate issued a joint judicial interpretation entitled, “Explanation on Questions Concerning the Concrete Application of Laws Handling Criminal Cases of Organizing and Making Use of Heretical Organizations.” The interpretation applies Article 300 of the Criminal Code to those illegal groups that have been found using religion, qigong or other things as a camouflage, deifying their leaders, recruiting and controlling their members and deceiving people by molding and spreading superstitious ideas, and endangering society. The interpretation goes on to detail the punishment for those found guilty of violating the law. Some of the violations include besieging government organizations, enterprises, or institutions, holding demonstrations to disrupt public places for religious activities, resisting the ban, or publishing or distributing illegal material. The interpretation goes on to read:

The offences of establishing or using sects to organize, scheme, carry out and instigate activities of splitting China, endangering the reunification of China or subverting the country’s socialist system should be handled according to relevant laws on endangering State security offences, as stipulated in the Criminal Law.Footnote 12

On 5 November 1999, the Supreme People’s Court issued Notice 29, 1999 instructing local and military courts on how to handle cases of people involved with crimes for “organizing or using heretical organizations, particularly Falun Gong.” It also called on the courts to “unify their thinking,” and “grasp the heretical character of Falun Gong” and the “threat” it posed, and to “fully understand” the spirit of important directives given to central authorities about “how to deal with and resolve the Falun Gong question.” The Notice states:

Courts at all levels must be ‘fully aware’ of the ‘important, complex, and long-term’ nature of this ‘struggle’ and they must make it their ‘serious political duty’ to punish ‘every kind of heretical organization crime.’ Courts at all levels must handle these cases under the leadership of the Party committees. Higher courts are to supervise lower courts and use the media to publicize significant cases in order to increase the social impact of the trials. Other means should also be found to publicize the trials so as ‘to educate the large masses of people’ and to make them aware of the ‘heretical organizations’ that were ‘opposing science, humanity, society and the government.’Footnote 13

This decree seems to fit into the conception of socialist legality and the use of the court system as an instrument to suppress dissent and “educate” the masses. The tone of the notice seems to convey the message, “vigorously convict.” It also makes reference to the court’s political duty, even though the state and Party are separate entities, according to the PRC Constitution. Finally, the notice makes reference to the importance of educating the masses about the heretical nature of Falun Gong and its posited opposition to science, society, and government.

On 24 November 1999, the Ministry of Public Security issued “Regulations on Managing Mass Cultural and Sports Activities.” This was intended to ban large public gatherings, especially those involving qigong groups that “threaten national security and public order.” Nine specific types of gatherings are forbidden under the regulations, including those that:

...violate principles of the constitution, or endanger national security and public order, infringe upon customs of ethnic minorities, violate ethnic unity and instigate national separatism, propagate superstition and heresy, pornography and violence that are detrimental to the health of the people.Footnote 14

Virtually any group’s activities could be suppressed under these provisions. The regulations also state, “mass congregations shall not be held near places of governmental agencies above the local level, at radio or television stations, foreign embassies and consulates, military establishments and other vital institutions.”Footnote 15 The regulations empower police to detain and fine people found in violation of them.

In February 2001, less than 2 years after the massive demonstration at Party headquarters that provoked the campaign against Falun Gong, President Jiang Zemin summoned more than 2,000 top Party officials to Beijing for a rare closed-door meeting. All senior central officials, top Party leaders from each province, and leaders of the military, the judiciary and government ministries attended. The reason for the meeting was to ensure that the “Party remained united against the campaign to crush the Falun Gong, as well as supportive of the decision in 1989 to use troops against the democratic protesters in Tiananmen Square.”Footnote 16

All seven members of the Standing Committee of the Party’s Politburo stood up at this unusual meeting to endorse the anti-Falun Gong campaign as an “urgent necessity.” President Jiang and other top leaders made it clear that they planned to crush the Falun Gong movement before the end of their terms at the 2002 Party Congress. Jiang went on to accuse local officials of not enthusiastically stamping out the movement, and of allowing practitioners to go unhindered to Beijing to protest. After the meeting, government officials briefed Party organizations and government agencies throughout the PRC about the official anti-Falun Gong policy. This meeting serves as an indication of how important these two issues are to the PRC political leadership. According to Erik Eckholm and Elisabeth Rosenthal, whose article draws heavily on interviews with two officials who disagree with the Party’s approach, Party leaders asserted that Falun Gong has become a tool of the West and the CIA, which they believed were directly nurturing and protecting the Falun Gong organization.

In December 2001, Beijing imposed a ban on using the Internet to organize or coordinate the activities of “evil cults.”Footnote 17 Coupled with the State Council’s ban on the Falun Dafa organization in July, the regulations and Internet ban seem to contradict several rights guaranteed in the PRC Constitution, including citizens’ rights to enjoy freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, procession and demonstration protected under Article 35 of the Chinese Constitution. These and other actions of the Chinese government clearly show the level of concern about the Falun Gong, and the immense power of the State when it focuses on suppression of a minority faith.

Conclusions

The extent of the level of state organized violence against the Falun Gong in the massive effort to deprogram adherents to the Falun Gong may be surprising to observers from the West who are more accustomed to less direct and punitive actions against minority religions. Indeed, in some Western nations, particularly the United States, efforts to deprogram members of unpopular minority faiths have usually been relegated to the realm of private self-help actions by individuals and private organizations. Some “checks and balances” against deprogramming from minority religious groups were available to participants, usually through the use of the courts and organizations such as the ACLU to defend against deprogramming. And eventually the worst abuses of the deprogramming movement in the Unites States were limited by court decisions. However, in China the actions were organized by the State, and were pervasive in their effects. There were no checks and balances operating, and the will of a small cadre of CCP leaders was implemented with a vengeance, and very effectively, as the statistics cited above demonstrate.

It is worth noting that in China the Falun Gong became defined quickly as an illegal and criminal movement, and those new laws and edicts were applied retroactively and thoroughly. Many ordinary citizens and political and intellectual leaders were caught up in the state sanctioned deprogramming effort, as were the institutional structures such as the mass media and the educational and justice institutions.

Between the two extremes of private self-help actions in the United States and some other Western nations and the repressive tactics of the Chinese government there are two other “ideal types” of deprogramming illustrated above that involve varying degrees of state involvement. One such type is when state officials, specifically law enforcement and the courts, choose to ignore violations of law when young adults members of unpopular (but not illegal) religious groups are kidnapped and forced to undergo deprogramming done by private individuals or organizations. This has occurred frequently, particularly in the 1970s in the United States before some key court decisions were implemented that undercut such actions.

Another type occurs when the State takes systematic action but in a covert manner, as described by Marx [16], against groups operating legally, but which are disfavored by those in positions of power. Such efforts can include deliberate attempts to discourage participation in these groups and movements. This type of action has occurred in the United States particularly with political groups, and to some extent with religious ones such as was the case initially with the Branch Davidians outside Waco [37].Footnote 18 However, such covert governmental actions are not so rare in some other countries, as shown by efforts to deal with minority faiths in some former communist countries [26, 32].

One final comment concerns the stability of the four types illustrated herein. These are to be considered ideal types in the Weberian sense. Obviously there is a blurring of the lines between these four types on the continuum I have presented, and some situations move from one category to another over time. Repression can eventually give way to acceptance, and vice-versa. And the level and type of involvement of governmental authorities varies greatly as well, and can change. But these observations notwithstanding, it is clear that there is considerable effort being put forth by private individuals and organizations as well as by governments to encourage if not force people to change their affiliations and even beliefs when individuals are participating in unpopular groups, some of which may also be deemed criminal.