Abstract
Data has become a crucial resource to increase firms' efficiency in product design, production, distribution, marketing and virtually all parts of the value chain. From a competition policy perspective, however, the question emerges whether a firm's data ‘treasure’ can be the source of competitive advantage that make sit very unlikely or even impossible for other firms to catch up in the foresee able future.
While digital platforms have injected competition into manymarkets, there is also an increased risk of market foreclosureby large platforms due to the tippy ‘winner-takes-all’ nature of these markets.
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Haucap, J. Competition and Competition Policy in a Data-Driven Economy. Intereconomics 54, 201–208 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10272-019-0825-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10272-019-0825-0