Abstract
We consider the case where political advertising is targeted to a subset of uninformed voters and show how pressure groups, candidates, and uninformed voters interact to achieve an equilibrium outcome. The paper accomplishes the following: (1) It derives the optimal behavior of those uninformed voters who do not received targeted campaign advertising. (2) It suggests that previous results may have exaggerated the power of pressure groups and political advertising—even when there is directed advertising, any negative effect is mitigated by strategic behavior of the uninformed. (3) In the limit, pressure group donations move the outcome toward the median voter, contrary to what much of the literature on pressure groups claims.
Article PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.
References
Bailey M (2002) Money and representation. Georgetown University working paper
Baron DP (1994) Electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters. Am Polit Sci Rev 88:33–47
Coate S (2004) Political contributions with campaign contributions and informative advertising. Am Econ Rev 98:624–655
Grossman HI (1991) A general equilibrium model of insurrections. Am Econ Rev 81:912–921
Grossman GM, Helpman E (1996) Electoral competition and special interest politics. Rev Econ Stud 63:265–286
Grossman GM, Helpman E (1999) Competing for endorsements. Am Econ Rev 89:501–524
Lupia A, McCubbins M (1998) The democratic dilemma: can citizens learn what they need to know?. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Plott C (1967) A notion of equilibrium and its possibility under majority rule. Am Econ Rev 57:787–806
Schultz C (2007) Strategic campaigns and redistributive politics. Econ J (forthcoming)
Wittman D (2006) Pressure group endorsements and political advertising. University of California, Santa Cruz, Department of Economics Working paper
Wittman D (2007) Candidate quality, pressure group endorsements, and uninformed voters. Eur J Polit Econ (forthcoming)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Wittman, D. Targeted political advertising and strategic behavior by uninformed voters. Economics of Governance 9, 87–100 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-007-0035-2
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-007-0035-2