Abstract
We consider a relationship between equity and efficiency in queueing problems. We show that under strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare implies queue-efficiency. Furthermore, by combining the result of Kayı and Ramaekers (Games Econ Behav 68:220–232, 2010) with ours, we also give a characterization of the class of rules that satisfy strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and budget-balance.
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Hashimoto, K., Saitoh, H. Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency. Soc Choice Welf 38, 473–480 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0540-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0540-7