Abstract
We consider a committee of representatives that makes dichotomous choices (acceptance/rejection) by vote. Given the size of each group represented, what is the most adequate voting rule for the committee? We provide answers based on each of the two principles commonly used to make normative assessments in different contexts: egalitarianism and utilitarianism. To that end, we introduce utilities into the model and adopt a normative approach.
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Laruelle, A., Valenciano, F. Egalitarianism and utilitarianism in committees of representatives. Soc Choice Welf 35, 221–243 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0438-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0438-9