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von Stengel, B. Computation of Nash equilibria in finite games: introduction to the symposium. Econ Theory 42, 1–7 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0452-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0452-2