Abstract
To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a strictly positive and finite weight. These weights may differ across alternatives. Given the voting decisions of every individual (individuals are allowed to vote for, or approve of, as many alternatives as they wish to), society elects the alternative for which the product of total number of votes times exogenous weight is maximal. If the product is maximal for more than one alternative, a pre-specified tie-breaking rule is applied. Our main result is an axiomatic characterization of this family of voting procedures.
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Massó, J., Vorsatz, M. Weighted approval voting. Economic Theory 36, 129–146 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0263-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0263-2