Abstract
Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, experimentally.
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Apesteguia, J., Dufwenberg, M. & Selten, R. Blowing the Whistle. Economic Theory 31, 143–166 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0092-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0092-8
Keywords
- Anti-trust
- Leniency
- Immunity
- Amnesty
- Blow the whistle
- Cartels
- Price competition
- Bertrand model
- Experiment communication