Abstract
Global warming (GW) is now recognized as a significant threat to sustainable development on an international scale. After providing some introductory background material, we introduce a benchmark dynamic game within which to study the GW problem. The model allows for population growth and is subsequently generalized to allow for changes in technology. In each case, a benchmark “Business as Usual” (BAU) equilibrium is analyzed and contrasted with the efficient solution. Furthermore, a complete characterization is provided in the benchmark model of the entire subgame perfect equilibrium value correspondence.
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JEL Classification Q54, D99, O12
This paper builds on the Woytinsky Lecture delivered by Roy Radner at the University of Michigan, March 11, 1998. We would like to thank Graciela Chichilnisky, Arnulf Grubler, Geoffrey Heal, Leonid Hurwicz, Jill Jaeger, Peter de Janosi, Paul Kleindorfer, Giuseppe Lopomo, Thomas Schelling, Tapan Mitra, and Michael Toman for helpful discussions and references, and Andrew King, Charlotte V. Kuh, and Frank Sinden for comments on an earlier draft. In the case of the present enterprise, much of whose scope lies outside of our previous expertise, it is even more important than usual to emphasize that we are responsible for all errors.
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Dutta, P.K., Radner, R. Population growth and technological change in a global warming model. Economic Theory 29, 251–270 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0056-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0056-4