Abstract
This paper defendsintensional essentialism: a property (intensional entity) is not essential relative to an individual (extensional entity), but relative to other properties (or intensional entities). Consequently, an individual can have a property only accidentally, but in virtue of having that property the individual has of necessity other properties. Intensional essentialism is opposed to various aspects of the Kripkean notion of metaphysical modality, eg, varying domains, existence as a property of individuals, and its category of properties which are both empirical and essential with respect to particular individuals and natural kinds. The key notion of intensional essentialism isrequisite. A requisite is explicated as a relation-in-extension between two intensions (functions from possible worlds and moments of time)X, Y such that wherever and wheneverX is instantiatedY is also instantiated. We predict three readings of the sentence. “Every wooden table is necessarily wooden”, one involving modalityde re and the other two modalityde dicto. The first reading claims that no individual which is a wooden table is necessarily wooden. The claim is backed up by bare particular anti-essentialism. The two other interpretations claim that it is necessary that whatever is a wooden table is wooden. However, as we try to show, one is logically far more perspicuous thanks to the concept of requisite and thus preferable to more standardde dicto formalizations.
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Jespersen, B., Materna, P. Are wooden tables necessarily wooden?. Acta Analytica 17, 115 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03177511
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03177511