Abstract
The Economic and Strategic Motives for Antidumping Filings. — This paper looks at worldwide antidumping activity during the last two decades. We examine the motives for AD filings by countries in an attempt to identify whether economic or strategic concerns are driving the recent upsurge in AD use. We begin by providing a comprehensive overview of the data on cases initiated in the 1980–1998 period. We then use nonparametric methods to identify motivations for the use of antidumping and find considerable support for strategic motivations. This suggests that the rise in AD activity cannot be solely explained by an increase in unfair trading practices.
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