Abstract
For international environmental problems involving many countries, such as, e.g., the climate problem, it is unlikely that all countries will participate in an international environmental agreement. If some countries commit themselves to cooperate, while the remaining countries act independently and in pure self-interest, it appears to be possible to achieve a Pareto improvement if the non-signatory countries reduce their emissions, in exchange for transfers from the countries which sign an agreement. However, the paper shows that the prospect of receiving a transfer for reducing one's emissions provided the country does not commit itself to cooperation, tends to reduce the incentive a country might have to commit itself to cooperation. Moreover, if the disincentive effect of such side payments is strong, total emissions will be higher in a situation with side payments than in a situation in which the signatory countries commit themselves to not give transfers to free riding countries.
Article PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.
References
Barrett, S. (1993a), ‘Joint Implementation for Achieving National Abatement Commitments in the Framework Convention on Climate Change”, revised draft, London Business School (for OECD).
Barrett, S. (1993b), ‘A Strategic Analysis of “Joint Implementation” Mechanisms in the Framework Convention on Climate Change’, revised draft, London Business School (for UNCTAD), May 26.
Barrett, S. (1994a), ‘Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements’,Oxford Economic Papers 46 (October, special issue on environmental economics), 878–894.
Barrett, S. (1994b), ‘Trade Restrictions in International Environmental Agreements’, CSERGE working paper: GEC; 94, 13.
Bauer, A. (1993), ‘International Cooperation over Environmental Goods’, Mimeo, University of Munich.
Bohm, P. (1994), ‘On the Feasibility of Joint Implementation of Carbon Emissions Reductions’, Research papers in economics, Dept. of Economics, University of Stockholm.
Carraro, C. and D. Siniscalco (1993), ‘Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment’,Journal of Public Economics 52, 309–328.
Elster, J. (1989), ‘Social Norms and Economic Theory’,Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, 99–117.
Hanish, T., R. K. Pachauri, D. Schmitt, and P. Vellinga (1992), ‘The Climate Convention: Criteria and Guidelines for Joint Implementation’, Policy Note 1992: 2, CICERO, Oslo.
Hoel, M. (1992), ‘International Environmental Conventions: The Case of Uniform Reductions of Emissions’,Environmental and Resource Economics 2, 141–159.
Johnson, I. (1993a), ‘Operational Criteria for Joint Implementation”, OECD/IEA, International Conference on the Economics of Climate Change, Paris, June 14–16.
Johnson, I. (1993b), ‘Operational criteria for Joint Implementation; A Response’, OECD/IEA, International Conference on the Economics of Climate Change, Paris, June 14–16.
Torvanger, A. (1993), ‘Efficient Contracts in a Game of Nations Pursuing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Abatement’, CICERO Working Paper 93: 3, Center for Climate and Energy Research, Oslo.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Hoel, M., Schneider, K. Incentives to participate in an international environmental agreement. Environ Resource Econ 9, 153–170 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02441376
Accepted:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02441376