Abstract
It seems clear that individuals stand to mutually benefit, in a wide variety of situations, from structuring their interactions in terms of constitutional practices. But a commitment to treat the rules defining such practices as setting real constraints on choice—a commitment to what could be characterized as an “ethics of rules”—is hard to reconcile with the standard, consequentialist theory of rational choice, which requires, in effect, that individuals regard any rule as providing no more than a “maxim” for choice. Such a theory of rational choice, then, constrains individuals to settle for a second best outcome in which choice is aligned with practice rules by means of strategies of precommitment and threats. The outcome is second best because such methods yield only partial alignment, and involve the expenditure of scarce resources, as well as a sacrifice of flexibility and freedom. To say this, however, is to identify the corresponding theory of rational choice as havingconsequentially unacceptable implications. A modified theory of choice is presented, which is still consequentially oriented, but which assesses consequences in a more holistic manner. It is then argued that this modified theory can provide a rational choice grounding for the needed “ethics of rules.”
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The author would like to thank three anonymous referees for their very helpful comments and suggestions.
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McClennen, E.F. Rationality, constitutions, and the ethics of rules. Constit Polit Econ 4, 173–210 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393079
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393079