Abstract
The experimental evidence against expected utility theo or unconvincing. When one modifies the experiments to mi tends to support traditional theory.
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Dewey H. Johnson Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, College of Business Administration, University of South Carolina. I am grateful for comments from seminar participants at the University of Melbourne, University of South Carolina, University of Stockholm, and the University of Western Ontario. John Hey provided a firm, but sympathetic, editorial hand.