Abstract
Players often have flexibility in when they move and thus whether a game is played simultaneously or sequentially may be endogenously determined. For 2 × 2 games, we analyze this using an extended game. In a stage prior to actual play, players choose in which of two periods to move. A player moving at the first opportunity knows when his opponent will move. A player moving at the second turn learns the first mover's action. If both select the same turn, they play a simultaneous move subgame.
If both players have dominant strategies in the basic game, equilibrium payoffs in the basic and extended games are identical. If only one player has a dominant strategy or if the unique equilibrium in the basic game is in mixed strategies, then the extended game equilibrium payoffs differ if and only if some pair of pure strategies Pareto dominates the basic game simultaneous play payoffs. If so, sequential play attains the Pareto dominating payoffs. The mixed strategy equilibrium occurs only when it is not Pareto dominated by some pair of pure strategies.
In an alternative extended game, players cannot observe delay by opponents at the first turn. Results for 2×2 games are essentially the same as with observable delay, differing only when only one player has a dominant strategy.
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Hamilton, J.H., Slutsky, S.M. Endogenizing the order of moves in matrix games. Theor Decis 34, 47–62 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01076104
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01076104