Conclusion
From the perspective of some common criteria for evaluating voting procedures, the results we offer in this essay will almost certainly be interpreted as inditments of STV. Even if we restrict preferences with conditions R1 and R2, STV is not necessarily incentive compatible. Moreover, strategic voting does not ensure the selection of Condorcet winning candidates or of Condorcet outcomes. This fact, moreover is not dependent on the existence of “bogus” equilibria — outcomes that exclude Condorcet candidates cannot be avoided under all circumstances even if we limit our analysis to strong or to individually stable equilibria.
It is not the case, though, that the Condorcet criterion is the unique or even the most important criterion with which to evaluate election procedures. For example, we have not examined the extent to which STV ensures proportionality and we have not compared STV to other procedures. Despite the apparent deficiencies described in this essay, STV may yet prove to be a viable alternative to systems that seek to ensure proportionality by other means.
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Ordeshook, P.C., Zeng, L. Some properties of Hare voting with strategic voters. Public Choice 78, 87–101 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01053367
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01053367