Abstract
It is shown that the basic normative argument of thecalculus is moored to a collectivistic unanimity norm. As most scholars working in the field of public choice, including the authors of the seminalcalculus, would otherwise reject collectivistic normative premises, a re-interpretation of the status of the unanimity principle of thecalculus seems unavoidable. The paper argues that this can be done if the basic formation of a society is not characterized as starting from a given set of individuals but rather in terms of the formation of clubs. This amounts to the same thing as substituting universalistic ethical premises by particularistic ones which are more in line with standard economic methodology.
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I have benefited greatly from Charles Rowley's excellent oral comments at the Public Choice Society Meetings.
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Kliemt, H. The calculus of consent after thirty years. Public Choice 79, 341–353 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047777
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047777