Abstract
VP-functions explain the support for the government at votes and polls by economic and political variables. Most studies analyze macro time series. We also cover studies of individual voters, socio-economic groups and regional cross-sections. The theory starts from the Responsibility Hypothesis: voters hold the government responsible for economic conditions. It works in two party/block systems, but not else. Voters in most countries are found to be sociotropic. Egotropic voting also occurs. Voters' myopia is well established. Voting is retrospective as expectations are static. It costs the average government almost 2% of the vote to rule.
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This is an invited article. We are responsible for the assessments and all the difficult choices about what should be included and what should be left out. However, several people have helped us notably Douglas Hibbs, Gebhard Kirchgässner and Friedrich Schneider. We are grateful also to the referee and to Lovell Jarvis for helping us weeding out unclear language and thoughts.
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Nannestad, P., Paldam, M. The VP-function: A survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after 25 years. Public Choice 79, 213–245 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047771
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047771