Concluding remarks
The political feasibility of protectionist policies that regulate international industry derives from the absence of overt collusion among domestic import-competing producers. The regulation of international industry cannot be explicit since governments would thereby be perceived to be approving (or instigating) international collusion. Hence, voluntary export restraints have been popularly presented with a focus on the difficulties confronted by domestic import-competing producers and a de-emphasis on the mutual gains to domestic and foreign producers from monitoring by a foreign government of a restrictive export cartel arrangement. Similarly, trigger-price mechanisms have popularly been explained in terms of the need for anti-dumping measures to preserve ‘fair’ competition. Likewise, the involuntary export tax derived in the first instance from an administratively validated (but, as demonstrated by Kalt's econometric analysis, contentious) complaint of ‘unfair’ foreign competition. Voluntary export restraints, trigger-price mechanisms, and involuntary export taxes are however protectionist devices, the beneficiaries of which can transcend national jurisdictions, and which have in common the characteristic that the gains to domestic industry interests derive from the regulation of foreign competitors.
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Hillman, A.L. Protectionist policies as the regulation of international industry. Public Choice 67, 101–110 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00714393
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00714393