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References
W. & O., p. 54. See also ‘Ontological Relativity’,Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968) 185–212.
See my ‘Existence and Quantification’, inFact and Existence (ed. by J. Margolis), Blackwell, Oxford, 1968 (at press).
References
Robert Kirk, ‘Translation and Indeterminacy’,Mind (forthcoming).
Gilbert Harman, ‘Quine on Meaning and Existence’,Review of Metaphysics 21 (1967) 124–151, 343–367, specifically pp. 142ff.
References
Hilary Putnam, ‘The “Innateness Hypothesis” and Explanatory Models in Linguistics’,Synthese 17 (1967) 12–22.
When Chomsky finds “this factual assumption far from obvious”, he is assuming that the mechanism of conditioned response has to apply simply to each of the innumerable sentences as an unstructured whole. I discussed this misunderstanding in § 2 of the present reply.
References
‘Reply to Professor Marcus’, inThe Ways of Paradox And Other Essays, p. 181.
‘Existence and Quantification’, inFact and Existence (ed. by J. Margolis), Blackwell's, Oxford (at press).
Reference
Cf. ‘Carnap and Logical Truth’, inThe Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, pp. 104f.
References
‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, inFrom a Logical Point of View, p. 33.
I made a point of this superiority in ‘Carnap and Logical Truth’, inThe Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, p. 123.
P. F. Strawson, ‘Propositions, Concepts, and Logical Truth’,Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1957) 15–25.
References
See Anders Wedberg, ‘On the Principles of Phonemic Analysis’,Ajatus 26 (1964) 235–253.
SeeWord and Object, pp. 111, 140f.
SeePrincipia Mathematica, 2nd ed., I, p. 24.
References
See ‘On an Application of Tarski's Theory of Truth’, in mySelected Logic Papers, pp. 144f.
Anatomy of Inquiry, pp. 108ff.
References
‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’, inThe Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, p. 188.
Robert Sleigh, ‘On Quantifying into Epistemic Contexts’,Noûs 1 (1967) 1–31, p. 28. See also Hintikka,Knowledge and Belief, pp. 141–144.
From a Logical Point of View, 2nd ed., 1961, pp. 152f.
A. F. Smullyan, ‘Modality and Description’,Journal of Symbolic Logic 13 (1948) 31–37.
Dagfinn Føllesdal, ‘Knowledge, Identity, and Existence’,Theoria 33 (1967) 1–27.
References
Dagfinn Føllesdal, ‘Knowledge, Identity, and Existence’,Theoria 33 (1967) 1–27.
N. L. Wilson, ‘Substances without Substrata’,Review of Metaphysics 12 (1959) 521–539.
In a 1965 lecture ‘Propositional Objects’, forthcoming inCritica, I explored this possibility somewhat.
See the last paragraph of my reply to Sellars.
R. M. Chisholm, ‘Identity through Possible Worlds’,Noũs 1 (1967) 1–8.
Word and Object, pp. 164, 168, 192, 194.
Word and Object, p. 216. The term ‘attitudinative’ is a classroom addition.
See my adjoining reply to Davidson, and see his ‘Truth and Meaning’, Synthese17 (1967) 304–323.
References
Dana Scott, ‘Quine's Individuals’, inLogic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science (ed. by E. Nagel, P. Suppes, and A. Tarski), Stanford 1962.
A. A. Fraenkel, ‘Der Begriff “definit” und die Unabhängigkeit des Auswahlsaxioms’,Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phys-math. Kl., 1922, 253–257.
See mySet Theory and Its Logic, § 41.
Seeop. cit., § 42.
By ML, of course, I mean the system of the revised edition ofMathematical Logic, which incorporates Wang's repair of an earlier inconsistency.
Hao Wang, ‘A Formal System of Logic’,Journal of Symbolic Logic 15 (1950) 25–32. Or seeSet Theory and Its Logic, § 44.
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Quine, W.V. Replies. Synthese 19, 264–322 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00568060
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00568060