Abstract
The decision rules yielded respectively by the Rawlsian ‘maximin’ conception of justice and by classical utilitarianism are compared and contrasted. The discussion is based on the assumption of a pure distribution problem and sharp differences are brought out. An axiomatic analysis of the two conceptions is undertaken, the result of which is that Rawls and utilitarianism both omit essential aspects of distributional welfare judgments: Rawls leaves out questions of welfare differences, utilitarianism leaves out questions of welfare levels. It is possible to pay attention to the ranking of welfare levels without concentrating exclusively on the welfare levels of worst off persons only, thereby departing from both Bentham and Rawls.
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I have benefited from the comments of Partha Dasgupta.
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Sen, A. Rawls versus Bentham: An axiomatic examination of the pure distribution problem. Theor Decis 4, 301–309 (1974). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00136651
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00136651