Abstract
Given an extensive game, with every node x and every player i a subset k i (x) of the set of terminal nodes is associated, and is given the interpretation of player i's knowledge (or information) at node x. A belief of player i is a function that associates with every node x an element of the set K i (x). A belief system is an n-tuple of beliefs, one for each player. A belief system is rational if it satisfies some natural consistency properties. The main result of the paper is that the notion of rational belief system gives rise to a refinement of the notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium.
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Bonanno, G. Rational beliefs in extensive games. Theor Decis 33, 153–176 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134094
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134094