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Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution and Professor of Political Science at Stanford University. Special thanks are due to David Baron, Joseph Greenberg, Tom Palfrey, and Tom Romer for careful reading and criticism of earlier versions of this paper.
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Ferejohn, J. Incumbent performance and electoral control. Public Choice 50, 5–25 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124924
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124924