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Helpful comments from Gordon Tullock are gratefully acknowledged, but responsibility for the paper's content remains with the author.
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Holcombe, R.G. Non-optimal unanimous agreement. Public Choice 48, 229–244 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00051620
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00051620