Abstract
This article reviews recent developments on the analysis of the formation and the stability of international environmental agreements, which is called “new coalition theory”. Under this heading recently developed coalition games and equilibrium concepts are summarized, but also new interpretations of old concepts. It is emphasized that for analytical reasons but also to derive sound policy recommendations it is crucial to distinguish between the rules of coalition formation and the equilibrium concepts applied to determine the outcome in a coalition game. The aim of this article is to provide an introduction to new coalition theory, to highlight its analytical superiority over “old concepts” and to discuss policy implications of important results.
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Finus, M. (2003). New Developments in Coalition Theory. In: Marsiliani, L., Rauscher, M., Withagen, C. (eds) Environmental Policy in an International Perspective. Economy & Environment, vol 26. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0333-8_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0333-8_2
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