Abstract
This paper attempts to develop a philosophically acceptable account of what it means to say that certain claims of self-knowledge generate reasons for action. The paper concentrates in detail on the imagined case of a Dutch fanner who sincerely believes that deep down he really is a Surma warrior, and that this self-knowledge requires him to undergo a series of ‘trans-cultural’ plastic surgeries. It is claimed that many ordinary practical problems share significant features with this bizarre case. Some useful concepts are introduced and discussed: the idea of an alternative of oneself, a response-dependency account of evaluative properties, and three levels of self-knowledge, involving the ideas of intelligible order, explanatory power and peace of mind.
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Bransen, J. (2002). Making and Finding Oneself. In: Musschenga, A.W., van Haaften, W., Spiecker, B., Slors, M. (eds) Personal and Moral Identity. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 11. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9954-2_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9954-2_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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