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Cardinal Preference Aggregation Rules for the Case of Certainty

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Multiple Criteria Problem Solving

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 155))

Abstract

This paper presents a theory of cardinal social welfare functions for choices of certain consequences. This development parallels the social welfare theory for choices among risky consequences based on the assumption of social choice preferences consistent with the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. In the case of certainty, however, this axiomatic base is replaced with one from the theory of difference measurement. The result allows expressions of “strength of preference” to be explicitly incorporated into decision rules for social choice. Included are specifications of the independence conditions that imply additive, multiplicative, and more complicated forms of cardinal social welfare functions.

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© 1978 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Dyer, J.S., Sarin, R.K. (1978). Cardinal Preference Aggregation Rules for the Case of Certainty. In: Zionts, S. (eds) Multiple Criteria Problem Solving. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 155. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46368-6_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46368-6_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-08661-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-46368-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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