Abstract
The OECD Principles state
“Corporate governance requirements and practices are typically influenced by an array of legal domains, such as company law, securities regulation, accounting and auditing standards, insolvency law, contract law, labor law and tax law. Under these circumstances, there is a risk that the variety of legal influences may cause unintentional overlaps and even conflicts, which may frustrate the ability to pursue key corporate governance objectives. It is important that policy-makers are aware of this risk and take measures to limit it.”1
OECD, Principles of Corporate Governance, 31 (2004).
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References
OECD, Principles of Corporate Governance, 31 (2004).
MALLIN, Corporate Governance, 9 (2004).
SMERDON, A Practical Guide to Corporate Governance, 2 (2nd ed. 2004). CHAMBERS, Tolley’s Corporate Governance Handbook, 82 (2003) even states that he has “not found very visible use of the term” before 1984.
SMITH, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations, Vol. 2 Bk. 5 Ch. 1 Pt. 3 Art. 1 (1776).
See BÖCKING/DUTZI, Corporate Governance und Value Reporting, in: SEICHT (ed.), Jahrbuch für Controlling und Rechnungswesen 2003, 213, 215 (2003); MALLIN, supra note 2, at 9.
MALLIN, supra note 2.
SCHEFFLER, Corporate Governance — Auswirkungen auf den Wirtschaftsprüfer, 2005 WPg 477, 477. Similarly V. WERDER, in: RINGLEB/KREMER/LUTTER/V. WERDER, Kommentar zum Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex, Preliminary Remarks, note 1 (2nd ed. 2005); HABERER, Corporate Governance: Österreich — Deutschland — International, 1–3 (2003). See also ABELTSHAUSER Corporate Governance — Standort und Dimensionen, in: ABELTSHAUSER/BUCK (eds.), Corporate Governance: Tagungsband der 1. Hannoveraner Unternehmensrechtstage, 1, 7 (2004), who emphasizes the double meaning of the term “corporate governance” as the process of control and supervision on the one hand and the regulatory system governing that process on the other.
See e.g. the preamble to the OECD Principles, OECD, supra note 1, at 12: “While a multiplicity of factors affect the governance and decision-making process of firms, and are important to their long-term success, the Principles focus on governance problems that result from the separation of ownership and control.”
ABELTSHAUSER, supra note 8, at 4.
ABELTSHAUSER, id.
BÖCKING/ DUTZI, supra note 6, at 230; V. WERDER, supra note 8, at note 1; HABERER, supra note 8, at 157, 241.
See MALLIN, supra note 2, at 93.
ABELTSHAUSER, supra Corporate Governance — Standort und Dimensionen, in: ABELTSHAUSER/BUCK (eds.), Corporate Governance: Tagungsband der 1. Hannoveraner Unternehmensrechtstage, (2004) note 8, at 13.
ABELTSHAUSER, id. at 5.
ABELTSHAUSER, id., at 6.
See e.g. HABERER, supra note 8, at 52 on the lack of clarity of the OECD Principles in that respect.
ABELTSHAUSER, supra Corporate Governance — Standort und Dimensionen, in: ABELTSHAUSER/BUCK (eds.), Corporate Governance: Tagungsband der 1. Hannoveraner Unternehmensrechtstage, (2004) note 8, at 11.
See on the following MALLIN, supra note 2, at 10–12.
MALLIN, supra note 2, at 11. The important role of agency costs in corporate governance is exemplified by the statement of Alastair Ross Goobey, the chairman of the International Corporate Governance Network, made in 2003 that “Corporate Governance is only about reducing the cost of capital: If we can’t establish that beyond peradventure then we are wasting our time. This is not a moral crusade.” See SMERDON, supra note 3, at 1.
HABERER, supra note 8, at 7 et seq.; MALLIN, supra note 2, at 12.
LA PORTA/ LOPEZ-DE-SILANES/ SHLEIFER, Corporate ownership around the world, 54 Journal of Finance 471 (1999).
HABERER, supra note 8, at 12 et seq.
See MALLIN, supra note 2, at 12–13.
See also WHITEHOUSE, Corporate Social Responsibility as Regulation: The Argument for Democracy, in: O’BRIEN (ed.), Governing the Corporation. Regulation and Corporate Governance in an Age of Scandal and Global Markets, 141, 146 (2005): “... the ‘transaction costs’ version of the nexus of contracts theory contends that rational actors seek to contract in a way that minimises transaction costs. Shareholders, however, unlike other parties related to the company, put their entire investment at risk and cannot protect themselves contractually because of the open-ended character of their rights so, instead, they receive governance rights.”
Cited according to SMERDON, supra note 3, at 250.
SMERDON, id., at 251.
WHITEHOUSE, supra note 26, at 148.
OECD, supra note 1, at 12.
“The good company — A survey of corporate social responsibility”, The Economist, January 22, 2005, 6.
WHITEHOUSE, supra note 26, at 142–143, 159.
See WHITEHOUSE, supra note 26, at 142 et seq.
See for a brief overview OWENS, The Interface of Tax and Good Corporate Governance, 37 Tax Notes Int’l 767 (2005).
OWENS, id., at 767; REPETTI, Accounting and Taxation: The Misuse of Tax Incentives to Align Management-Shareholder Interests, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 697, 699 (1997).
Only a few scholars have comprehensively analysed the interactions of tax law and corporate governance. See SALZBERGER, Wechselwirkungen zwischen Corporate Governance und Besteuerung, 2000 Die Betriebswirtschaft (DBW) 210; KRAFT, Das Corporate Governance-Leitbild des deutschen Unternehmenssteuerrechts. Bestandsaufnahme — Kritik — Reformbedarf; Arbeitspapiere aus dem Institut für Wirtschaftsrecht, Heft 13 (2003); WAGNER, Unternehmenssteuerreform und Corporate Governance; 2000 StuW 109; KANNIAINEN, Failures in Corporate Governance: Can the Corporation Tax Improve Efficiency?, 1999 FinanzArchiv 310; DESAI/DYCK/ZINGALES, Theft and Taxes, ECGI-Finance Research Paper No. 63/2005 (2005) (available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=629350); OWENS, supra note 35.
SALZBERGER, Wechselwirkungen zwischen Corporate Governance und Besteuerung, 2000 Die Betriebswirtschaft (DBW) id., at 210; on the development of corporate governance in the United States see ROE, Strong Managers, Weak Owners. The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (1994).
See for example WAGNER, supra note 37, at 109.
See KRAFT, supra Das Corporate Governance-Leitbild des deutschen Unternehmenssteuerrechts. Bestandsaufnahme — Kritik — Reformbedarf; Arbeitspapiere aus dem Institut für Wirtschaftsrecht, Heft 13 (2003) note 37, at 8.
See KRAFT, Das Corporate Governance-Leitbild des deutschen Unternehmenssteuerrechts. Bestandsaufnahme — Kritik — Reformbedarf; Arbeitspapiere aus dem Institut für Wirtschaftsrecht, Heft 13 (2003) id., at 8; WAGNER, supra note 37, at 109.
See WAGNER, Das Corporate Governance-Leitbild des deutschen Unternehmenssteuerrechts. Bestandsaufnahme — Kritik — Reformbedarf; Arbeitspapiere aus dem Institut für Wirtschaftsrecht, Heft 13 (2003) id., at 109.
HARTMANN, Comment: the Market for Corporate Confusion: Federal Attempts to Regulate the Market for Corporate Control through the Federal Tax Code, 6 DePaul Bus. L. J. 159, 166 (1994).
HARTMANN, id., at 169.
See id.
OWENS, supra note 35.
See for example BANK, Tax, Corporate Governance, and Norms, 61 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1159, 1161 (2004): “In fact, almost since the inception of corporate income tax, [the U.S.] Congress has recognized its potential to serve as a de facto system of federal corporate law... Federal taxation was a means to pre-empt the traditional state role in the regulation of corporations without actually establishing a system of federal incorporation”.
BANK, id., at 1164 with detailed reference to all provisions.
See BANK, id., at 1163: “Perhaps the best prism through which to understand the use of taxation to modify corporate behaviour is the experience of the New Deal.”
See BANK, id., at 1164, 1166; SCHIZER, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 440, 446 (2000).
See BANK, id., at 1164, 1231.
BANK, id., at 1164, 1232.
OWENS, supra note 35.
See for example STEPHAN, Disaggregation and Subchapter C: Rethinking Corporate Tax Reform, 76 Va. L. Rev. 655, 656 (1990).
HARTMANN, supra note 45.
HARTMANN, id., at 177 with reference to Sec. 382 IRC (1982).
See STEPHAN, supra note 56.
HARTMANN, supra note 45, at 178.
See MISKE, Can’t Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of Trying to Control Executive Compensation Through The Tax Code, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1673, 1677 (2004).
See MISKE, id., at 1678.
HARTMANN, supra note 45, at 179.
HARTMANN, supra note 45, at 179.
REPETTI, supra note 36, at 704.
See REPETTI, id., at 706 with reference to such an exception for non-publicly held corporations in the United States.
See MISKE, supra note 61, at 1680.
See H. R. Rep. No. 3545, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1086 (1987) and in detail: HARTMANN, supra note 45, at 182; REPETTI, Corporate Governance and Stockholder Abdication: Missing Factors in Tax Policy Analysis, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 971, 1027 (1992); REPETTI, supra note 36, at 706.
HARTMANN, id., at 182.
REPETTI, supra note 36, at 706.
HARTMANN, supra note 45, at 184.
See HARTMANN, id., at 184, 187 in more detail with respect to the potential benefits for the shareholders, such as increased market information, the tendency to encourage other bids, thus ensuring that assets are reallocated to users who attribute the highest value to them.
See also REPETTI, supra note 68, at 1031.
On the U.S. provisions see STEPHAN, supra note 56, at 677.
STEPHAN, id., at 704.
STEPHAN, id.
See SALZBERGER, supra Wechselwirkungen zwischen Corporate Governance und Besteuerung, 2000 Die Betriebswirtschaft (DBW) note 37, at 211.
KRAFT, supra Das Corporate Governance-Leitbild des deutschen Unternehmenssteuerrechts. Bestandsaufnahme — Kritik — Reformbedarf; Arbeitspapiere aus dem Institut für Wirtschaftsrecht, Heft 13 (2003) note 37.
See recently SCHÖN, Capital Gains Taxation in Germany, 2005 British Tax Review (BTR) 620, 626.
See for further details LEMNITZER, Transparenz-und Publizitätsgesetz — Rechnungslegungsrelevante Aspekte, 2002 Bilanzbuchhalter und Controller (BC) 248, 251.
For an example see KRAFT, supra Das Corporate Governance-Leitbild des deutschen Unternehmenssteuerrechts. Bestandsaufnahme — Kritik — Reformbedarf; Arbeitspapiere aus dem Institut für Wirtschaftsrecht, Heft 13 (2003) note 37, at 10, 11.
See SCHÖN, Eine Zukunft für das Maßgeblichkeitsprinzip, in: SCHÖN (ed.), Steuerliche Maßgeblichkeit in Deutschland und Europa, 1 (2005), and SCHÖN, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: The Odd Couple: A Common Future for Financial and Tax Accounting?, 58 Tax L. Rev. 111 (2005).
See also under 2.3.5 the discussion of the concept of a “certification tax”, and MAYER, Entwicklung der Maßgeblichkeit in Deutschland, in: SCHÖN (ed.), Steuerliche Maßgeblichkeit in Deutschland und Europa, 147, 154 et seq. (2005) on the justification of the authoritativeness principle in Germany with the notion that states participate in the profits of businesses similarly to partners or shareholders (Teilhaberthese).
See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, Report of Investigation of Enron Corporation and Related Entities Regarding Federal Tax and Compensation Issues, And Policy Recommendations. Volume I: Report, 8 (2003).
LINK, Die Maßgeblichkeitsdiskussion angesichts der Einführung von IAS/IFRS in die Rechnungslegung, in: SCHÖN (ed.), Steuerliche Maßgeblichkeit in Deutschland und Europa, 207, 230 (2005); SCHREIBER, Hat das Maßgeblichkeitsprinzip noch eine Zukunft?, in: BUDDE/MOXTER/OFFERHAUS (eds.), Handelsbilanzen und Steuerbilanzen. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Prof. Dr. h.c. Heinrich Beisse, 491, 500, 509 (1997) in respect of U.S. tax accounting.
STEWART, Fiscal incentives, corporate structure and financial aspects of treasury management operations, 29 Accounting Forum 271 (2005).
See KUN, Corporate Inversions: The Interplay of Tax, Corporate, and Economic Implications, 29 Del. J. Corp. L. 313 (2004).
See DESAI/DYCK/ZINGALES, supra note 37, at 37.
See AVI-YONAH, The Story of the Separate Corporate Income Tax: A Vehicle for Regulating Corporate Managers, in: BANK/STARK (eds.), Business Tax Stories, 11, 17 (2005) and KORNHAUSER, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 Ind. L. J., 53 (1990), who provides an extensive overview of the history of the U.S. Corporate Income Tax.
KORNHAUSER, id.
KORNHAUSER, id., at 54.
DESAI/ DYCK/ ZINGALES, supra note 37, at 37, also with reference to the historic introduction of the corporate tax in the United States in 1909.
DESAI/ DYCK/ ZINGALES, id., at 3.
DESAI/ DYCK/ ZINGALES, supra note 37, at 2.
HARTMANN, supra note 45, at 198.
ARLEN/ WEISS, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 Yale L. J. 325, 349 (1995).
ARLEN/ WEISS, id.
ARLEN/ WEISS, id., at 350.
See REPETTI, supra note 36, at 698.
OWENS, supra note 35, at 768.
See recently BANK, The Story of Double Taxation: A Clash over the Control of Corporate Earnings, in: BANK/STARK (eds.), Business Tax Stories, 153, 177 (2005).
See OWENS, supra note 35, at 768; KRAFT, supra note 37, at 8, 9; ARLEN/WEISS, supra note 100; WAGNER, supra note 37, at 118 et seq.; BANK, Corporate Managers, Agency Costs, and the Rise of Double Taxation; 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 167 (2002); KANDA, Taxes and the Structure of Japanese Firms: The Hidden Aspects of Income Taxation, 74 Wash. U. L. Q. 393 (1996); BANK, Is Double Taxation a Scapegoat for Declining Dividends? Evidence From History; 56 Tax L. Rev. 463 (2003).
KRAFT, Das Corporate Governance-Leitbild des deutschen Unternehmenssteuerrechts. Bestandsaufnahme — Kritik — Reformbedarf; Arbeitspapiere aus dem Institut für Wirtschaftsrecht, Heft 13 (2003) id., at 8.
ARLEN/ WEISS, supra note 100, at 352.
ARLEN/ WEISS, id., at 356.
See BANK, supra note 105.
See BANK, id., at 179.
See BANK, id.
See BANK, supra note 49, and ARLEN/WEISS, supra note 100, for an extensive and detailed analysis of the reasons for the corporation tax existing at all. They also provide empirical evidence that double taxation does not in any case lead to the retention of profits.
See also WAGNER, supra Unternehmenssteuerreform und Corporate Governance; 2000 StuW note 37, at 115.
See with the same result: ARLEN/WEISS, supra note 100, at 368.
See for example NOWOTNY, Auswirkungen der Maßgeblichkeit auf Corporate Governance, in: BERTL/EGGER/GASSNER/LANG/NOWOTNY (eds.), Die Maßgeblichkeit der handelsrechtlichen Gewinnermittlung für das Steuerrecht, 95, 101 (2003); SALZBERGER, supra note 37, at 212, 213; SOLFRIAN/SIEBRAßE, Der Wegfall der umgekehrten Maßgeblichkeit im Konzern, 2004 Steuern und Bilanzen 111.
SALZBERGER, supra Wechselwirkungen zwischen Corporate Governance und Besteuerung, 2000 Die Betriebswirtschaft (DBW) note 37, at 212 et seq.
NOWOTNY, supra Auswirkungen der Maßgeblichkeit auf Corporate Governance, in: BERTL/EGGER/GASSNER/LANG/NOWOTNY (eds.), Die Maßgeblichkeit der handelsrechtlichen Gewinnermittlung für das Steuerrecht (2003) note 116, at 101.
See NOWOTNY, Auswirkungen der Maßgeblichkeit auf Corporate Governance, in: BERTL/EGGER/GASSNER/LANG/NOWOTNY (eds.), Die Maßgeblichkeit der handelsrechtlichen Gewinnermittlung für das Steuerrecht (2003) id., at 101; WAGNER, Die umgekehrte Maßgeblichkeit der Handelsbilanz für die Steuerbilanz, 1990 StuW 3, 6; HENSCHEID, Ökonomische Wirkungen der umgekehrten Maßgeblichkeit, 1992 Betriebs-Berater (BB) 1243, 1244; ROBISCH/TREISCH, Neuere Entwicklungen des Verhältnisses von Handelsbilanz und Steuerbilanz — Anhaltspunkte für eine Trendwende, 1997 WPg 156, 167.
HEY, in: TIPKE/LANG, Steuerrecht, 663 (18th ed. 2005).
SALZBERGER, supra Wechselwirkungen zwischen Corporate Governance und Besteuerung, 2000 Die Betriebswirtschaft (DBW) note 37, at 212 et seq.
SALZBERGER, Wechselwirkungen zwischen Corporate Governance und Besteuerung, 2000 Die Betriebswirtschaft (DBW) id., at 212, 214.
SALZBERGER, Wechselwirkungen zwischen Corporate Governance und Besteuerung, 2000 Die Betriebswirtschaft (DBW) id., at 212, 214.
On the influence of large shareholders over managers see ROE, Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 10 (1991) with a sceptical view on the influence of company pension funds due to non-tax law restrictions.
ARLEN/ WEISS, supra note 100, at 350; REPETTI, supra note 36, at 701.
OWENS, supra note 35, at 768. See also REPETTI, id., at 711.
REPETTI, supra note 68, at 999. See id., at 1010, on the assumption that stockholders are able to realize the value of retained earnings at a preferential tax rate when selling their shares. This implies that the market value of shares reflects positively that less dividends are paid.
REPETTI, id., at 999; OWENS, supra note 35, at 768.
See REPETTI, id., at 1001.
See BANK, supra note 105, at 180.
For a brief summary of the historical background see REPETTI, supra note 68, at 1018. For a general overview not related to taxes see FERRARINI/MOLONEY, Executive Remuneration and Corporate Governance in the EU: Convergence, Divergence, and Reform Perspectives, 2004 European Company and Financial Law Review (ECFR) 251. For a different perspective see BOOTH, Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and the Partner-Manager, 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 269.
REPETTI, supra note 36, at 701.
REPETTI, supra note 68, at 1022; PAK, Toward Reasonable Executive Compensation: An Outcry for Reform and Regulatory Response, 1994 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 633, 643; REPETTI, supra note 36, at 701.
PAK, id.; REPETTI, supra note 36, at 701.
See in detail above, 2.4.6, and REPETTI, supra note 36, at 701.
For a summary of economic studies on the effectiveness of stock options see REPETTI, supra note 36, at 701.
ARLEN/ WEISS, supra note 100, at 351.
STABILE, Is There a Role for Tax Law in Policing Executive Compensation?, 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 81, 85 (1998). In contrast see PAK, supra note 135, at 653 with respect to close corporations but emphasizing the reluctance of the courts in regard of public corporations.
See for a detailed analysis KAUTTER, The $1 Million Cap on Compensation Deductions, 1994 Tax Adviser 327.
STABILE, supra note 140, at 88.
See Sec. 162 (m)(4)(E) and Sec. 3121(a)(5) IRC and MISKE, supra note 61, at 1692.
See PAK, supra note 135, at 660.
STABILE, supra note 140, at 90; KENNEDY, A Primer on the Taxation of Executive Deferred Compensation Plans, 35 J. Marshall L. Rev. 487, 490, 538 (2002), also referring to the $200,000 limitations imposed on qualified retirement and profit sharing plans (Sec. 401(a)(17) IRC).
See MISKE, supra note 61, at 1687; HALL/LIEBMAN, The Taxation of Executive Compensation, NBER Working paper No. W7596 (2000) (available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=220848).
PAK, supra note 135, at 661.
STABILE, supra note 140, at 98.
SALZBERGER, supra Wechselwirkungen zwischen Corporate Governance und Besteuerung, 2000 Die Betriebswirtschaft (DBW) note 37, at 210, 216.
CLEMM/ CLEMM, Die körperschaftsteuerliche Behandlung von Aufsichtsratsvergütungen ist sinn-, system-und verfassungswidrig, 2001 Betriebs-Berater (BB) 1873; SALZBERGER, id., at 210, 216; KRAFT, supra note 37, at 13.
CLEMM/ CLEMM, Die körperschaftsteuerliche Behandlung von Aufsichtsratsvergütungen ist sinn-, system-und verfassungswidrig, 2001 Betriebs-Berater (BB) id., at 1878.
KRAFT, supra Das Corporate Governance-Leitbild des deutschen Unternehmenssteuerrechts. Bestandsaufnahme — Kritik — Reformbedarf; Arbeitspapiere aus dem Institut für Wirtschaftsrecht, Heft 13 (2003) note 37, at 14.
See OWENS, supra note 35, at 768; TRIANTIS, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1102, 1108 (2004).
SUGIN, Theories of the Corporation and the Tax Treatment of Corporate Philantropy, 71 N. Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 835, 856 (1997).
See SALZBERGER, supra Wechselwirkungen zwischen Corporate Governance und Besteuerung, 2000 Die Betriebswirtschaft (DBW) note 37, at 212, 214.
See BANK, supra note 105, at 179.
See BANK, id., at 179; see also STEPHAN, supra note 56, at 696.
STEPHAN, id., at 697.
See for example REPETTI, supra note 68, at 1033: “This Article strongly recommends that policymakers fully consider the interaction of the separation of ownership from control in public corporations with tax provisions intended to increase productivity or otherwise promote desired stockholder or management behaviour.” See also REPETTI, supra note 36, at 710; KANDA, supra note 106, and in detail HARTMANN, supra note 45, at 190.
HARTMANN, id., at 191; SURREY, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 705, 717 (1970).
See for a very thorough and detailed analysis HARTMANN, id., at 194; SURREY, id., at 720.
HARTMANN, id., at 194.
HARTMANN, id., at 199.
SURREY, supra note 160, at 725.
SURREY, id.
HARTMANN, supra note 45, at 198.
See REPETTI, supra note 36, at 710.
SLEMROD, The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness, 57 Nat. Tax J. 877, 894 (2004).
ALLINGHAM/ SANDMO, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 Journal of Public Economics 323 (1972); DEVOS, Penalties and Sanctions for Taxation Offences in the United Kingdom: Implications for Taxpayer Non-Compliance, 2005 European Taxation (ET) 287, 289, with a summary of empirical evidence. Work following ALLINGHAM/SANDMO, id., is presented by WU/TENG, Determinants of Tax Compliance — A Cross-Country Analysis, 2005 FinanzArchiv 393 and SLEMROD, id., at 882.
GASSNER, Steuergestaltung als Vorstandspflicht, in: BERNAT/BÖHLER/WEILINGER (eds.), Zum Recht der Wirtschaft. Festschrift Heinz Krejci zum 60. Geburtstag, 605, 621 (2001). See DEVOS, id., at 296 et seq. with empirical evidence on the effect of sanctions and the probability of detection and their relationship. For an application of prospect theory on tax compliance and enforcement see GUTHRIE, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1115, 1142 et seq. (2003), who predicts that taxpayers will be more risk averse and thus rather comply with tax law when they are in a “win-situation”, e.g. because they expect a refund, and for corresponding policy recommendations.
On doubts about the effectiveness of a deterrence approach in tax enforcement see BRAITHWAITE/BRAITHWAITE, Managing taxation compliance: The evolution of the ATO Compliance Model (2001) (available at http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/taxpubs/Braithwaites. ATAX.pdf). According to DEVOS, id., at 289, “legal sanctions are only effective when perceived to be very severe.”
KREIENBAUM/ WERDER, Amerikaner verschärfen Kampf gegen Corporate Tax Shelters, 2005 IStR 721.
On the details in substantive law, especially the “valid business purpose” and “economic substance” doctrines see e.g. KEINAN, Corporate Goverenance and Professional Responsibility in Tax Law, 17 Journal of Taxation and Regulation of Financial Institutions 10, 15 et seq. (2003).
See the distinction between “the good, the aggressive, and the ugly” by former IRS Large and Midsize Business Division Commissioner Larry Langdon, cited by STRATTON, Sarbanes-Oxley Symposium Squares Off Tax Directors and Regulators, 102 Tax Notes, 835, 836 (2004). See also KEINAN, id., at 20.
For details on British law see DEVOS, supra note 172, at 292, and on Austrian law see GASSNER, supra note 173, at 620.
Consequently, one aspect of tax evasion is usually concealment of the facts: “The common thread in all cases of evasion is concealment”, FREEDMAN, Defining Taxpayer Responsibility: In Support of a General Anti-Avoidance Principle, 2004 British Tax Review (BTR) 332, 347. See also JOHNSON, U.K. Tax Update: Go Ahead, Tax Adviser, Make My Day!, 39 Tax Notes Int’l 1003, 1004 (2005).
On the different standards possible see BEALE, Putting SEC Heat on Audit Firms and Corporate Tax Shelters: Responding to Tax Risk with Sunshine, Shame and Strict Liability, 29 J. Corp. L. 219, 244 et seq. (2004). See also KREIENBAUM/WERDER, supra note 175, at 723.
KPMG, Tax in the Boardroom. A Discussion Paper, 8 (2005) (available at www.kpmg.co.uk/pubs/beforepdf.cfm?PubID=1129#). Connected with this issue is the question whether transactions that yield tax advantages have to have a valid business purpose in order to be accepted. This is a question of substantive tax law and does not influence questions of corporate governance. The problem here is defining whether a valid business purpose exists. The most obvious cases are of course those in which a complete transaction is synthetical and is undertaken solely for tax-saving purposes. These often occur as marketed tax schemes that companies subscribe to without any implications for their day-to-day business. The differentiation becomes more difficult when actual business transactions are structured in a tax-efficient way, which in itself is completely legitimate. Here theories try to identify aspects of the transaction that differ from the route that would have been taken without any tax considerations and question the business purpose of these “deviations”. However, in complex transactions it is difficult to define what the normal way of implementation would have been. Often tax law explicitly and intentionally demands structuring transactions in a certain way. In such a case, following this demand of course only happens for tax reasons. Nevertheless, this is certainly not against the purpose of the law.
FREEDMAN, supra note 179, at 335 et seq.
KPMG, supra note 181, at 8. See e.g. statements cited by KENNEY, New Rules Should Deter Risky Tax Planning, Korb Says, 106 Tax Notes 1033 (2005).
FREEDMAN, supra note 179, at 347.
HARVARD LAW REVIEW, Governmental Attempts to Stem the Rising Tide of Corporate Tax Shelters, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2249, 2250 (2004); FREEDMAN, id., at 342 et seq. On the impact of the perception of tax fairness on compliance behavior see RICHARDSON, A Preliminary Study of the Impact of Tax Fairness Perception Dimensions on Tax Compliance Behaviour in Australia, 20 Australian Tax Forum 407 (2005).
FREEDMAN, id., at 343 et seq. with a very instructive example.
“[Taxpayers] have become used to the need to take artificial steps simply to achieve sensible taxation in some cases...”, FREEDMAN, id., at 345.
FREEDMAN, id., at 332.
SLEMROD, supra note 171, at 883, citing the judgment by judge Learned Hand in Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848 (2nd Cir. 1947, dissenting opinion).
FREEDMAN, supra note 179, at 335, 338 et seq.
FREEDMAN, id., at 337 et seq., 343.
KENNEY, supra note 183.
See STRATTON, Senate Panel Takes Industrywide Look at Shelter Business, 106 Tax Notes 750 (2005).
See ANONYMOUS, A Detailed Guide to Tax Opinion Standards, 106 Tax Notes 1469 (2005).
KENNEY, supra note 183.
For empirical data on the relationship between auditing efforts and compliance see SLEMROD, supra note 171, at 878 et seq.
See BEALE, supra note 180, at 250; KREIENBAUM/WERDER, supra note 175, at 721. For further details on this topic see the extensive coverage in Tax Notes and Tax Notes Int’l. For planned legislation in France see LINKLATERS, International Tax News — September/October 2005, 4.
See e.g. STRATTON, supra note 194.
See VOGELSANG, The Final Tax Shelter Disclosure Rules: Reporting, Registration, and List Maintenance Requirements, 78 Florida Bar Journal 30 (2004); HARVARD LAW REVIEW, supra note 185. On the British regime see: FOSTER/BARRY, A Very British Muddle!, 762 Tax Journal, October 25, 2004, 4. On the U.S. regime see MCNULTY/PROBASCO, Tax Shelter Disclosure and Penalties: New Requirements, New Exposures, 18 Journal of Taxation and Regulation of Financial Institutions 22 (2005). For comparisons of different systems see BLUMENTHAL, How the U.S. Deals with Tax Avoidance, 804 Tax Journal, September 12, 2005, 5, and KREIENBAUM/WERDER, supra note 175.
KREIENBAUM/ WERDER, Amerikaner verschärfen Kampf gegen Corporate Tax Shelters, 2005 IStR id., at 724.
SLEMROD, supra note 171, at 889; BEALE, supra note 180, at 220.
See 3.1.2.3 and 3.1.2.4. FREEDMAN, supra note 179, at 349.
BEALE, supra note 180, at 251; KREIENBAUM/WERDER, supra note 175, at 724.
BEALE, id., at 220.
KPMG, supra note 181, at 5; BRAITHWAITE/BRAITHWAITE, supra note 174; AUSTRALIAN TAXATION OFFICE, Large business and tax compliance, 4 (2003).
On the theory of multi-period relationships see SALZBERGER, Corporate Governance — Begriff und Aufgaben, in: BRECHT (ed.), Neue Entwicklungen im Rechnungswesen. Prozesse optimieren, Berichtswesen anpassen, Kosten senken, 153, 169 (2005).
BEALE, supra note 180, at 239 et seq.; BRAITHWAITE/BRAITHWAITE, supra note 174.
KPMG, supra note 181, at 8; HENDERSON GLOBAL INVESTORS, Tax, risk and corporate governance, 4 (2005) (available at www.henderson.com/global_includes/pdf/corporate_governance/tax_paper.pdf).
KPMG, id., at 4.
On compliance costs increasing with recent legislation see CREST, How Sarbanes Oxley is changing tax services, 16 International Tax Review 11 (4/2005).
The U.S. compliance assurance program might be seen as such an effort. See e.g. KENNEY, IRS Officials Discuss Progress Of Corporate Compliance Program, 108 Tax Notes 1502 (2005). See also KENNEY, Focus on Voluntary Compliance, Not Enforcement, Olson Says, 108 Tax Notes 169 (2005); from an empirical perspective: DEVOS, supra note 172, at 297.
See BRAITHWAITE/BRAITHWAITE, supra note 174.
“Risk-based approach”: KPMG, supra note 181, at 5. Tax risk management from the companies’ perspective is discussed in 3.4.2.4. The term “compliance risk management” is also used in OECD, OECD’s Current Tax Agenda, 19 (2005).
BEALE, supra note 180, at 220, 239 et seq. From an authority perspective some authors suggest that penalties perceived as too fierce may crowd out intrinsic motivation to pay taxes and thus have the effect of decreasing compliance instead of increasing it. See e.g. SLEMROD, supra note 171, at 883.
BEALE, id., at 220, 239 et seq.
KPMG, supra note 181, at 8, 16; skeptical on possible gains from generosity versus the treasury: GASSNER, supra note 173, at 622 et seq. See SMERDON, supra note 3, at 251–256 on the general notion that socially responsible business conduct may improve profitability, e.g. by improving the brand image and reputation, increasing customer loyalty or — due to the socially responsible investing movement — increasing the access to capital of companies.
KPMG, id., at 16.
BEALE, supra note 180, at 222. Note that some jurisdictions explicitly prohibit the publication of tax information, see e.g. Sec. 30 of the German General Tax Act (Abgabenordnung) and Sec. 355 of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch).
Especially if the tax strategy followed is clearly legal, public opinion towards it may not be so unfavorable; see FREEDMAN, supra note 179, at 342.
GASSNER, supra Steuergestaltung als Vorstandspflicht, in: BERNAT/BÖHLER/WEILINGER (eds.), Zum Recht der Wirtschaft. Festschrift Heinz Krejci zum 60. Geburtstag, (2001) note 173, at 609; SLEMROD, supra note 171, at 884, citing FRIEDMAN, New York Times Magazine, September 13, 1970.
ERNST & YOUNG, Tax Risk Management. The evolving role of tax directors, 4 (2004) (available at www.ey.com/global/download.nsf/International/EY_-_Tax_-_Tax_Risk_Management/$file/EY_Tax_Risk_Survey_Report.pdf); KPMG, supra note 181, at 4, 16; HENDERSON GLOBAL INVESTORS, supra note 210, at 2.
BEALE, supra note 180, at 241.
SLEMROD, supra note 171, at 886.
DEVOS, supra note 172, at 290.
CHEN/ CHU, Internal Control vs. External Manipulation: A Model of Corporate Income Tax Evasion; 36 RAND Journal of Economics 151 (2005) discuss a model showing that illegal tax evasion leads to an incompleteness of the compensation scheme offered to employees, resulting in an efficiency loss in internal control. However, this result is based on the assumption that compensation contracts compensating employees for tax evasion penalties will not be honored by courts. This may not be the case in all jurisdictions.
BEALE, supra note 180, at 240.
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 86.
BEALE, supra note 180, at 240.
BEALE, id., at 230: “credibility gap”.
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 86, at 6 et seq., 25.
BEALE, supra note 180, at 230; BEALE, Law Professor Offers Suggestions For Fighting Shelters, 103 Tax Notes 125 (2004).
BEALE, supra note 180, at 241, 243 et seq.; BEALE, supra note 236; SCHEFFLER, supra note 8, at 484 et seq.
SLEMROD, supra note 171, at 884 et seq.
See SCHEFFLER, supra Corporate Governance — Auswirkungen auf den Wirtschaftsprüfer, 2005 WPg 477, 477. Similarly V. WERDER, in: RINGLEB/KREMER/LUTTER/V. WERDER, Kommentar zum Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex, Preliminary Remarks, (2nd ed. 2005) note 8, at 478. For the background of the corporate governance discussion in agency theory see SALZBERGER, supra note 208, at 155 et seq.
On the goals the corporation as a whole should follow see KEINAN, supra note 176.
SLEMROD, supra note 171, at 884 et seq.
See KEINAN, supra note 176, at 10.
On the intrinsic motivation of individuals in tax matters see SLEMROD, supra note 171, at 883.
For an Austrian perspective see GASSNER, supra Steuergestaltung als Vorstandspflicht, in: BERNAT/BÖHLER/WEILINGER (eds.), Zum Recht der Wirtschaft. Festschrift Heinz Krejci zum 60. Geburtstag, 605 (2001) note 173, at 610.
KEINAN, supra note 176, at 19.
KEINAN, id.; GASSNER, supra note 173, at 609, 621 et seq.; SLEMROD, supra note 171, at 884.
BEALE, supra note 180, at 233 et seq.; SLEMROD, id., at 885.
KEINAN, supra note 176, at 11; ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 224, at 7.
ERNST & YOUNG, id., at 5. See also KEINAN, id., at 11 et seq.
KPMG, supra note 181, at 4.
KPMG, id., at 4.
KPMG, id.
Against the imposition of criminal or regulatory liabilities on directors and other corporate officers: KEINAN, supra note 176, at 10 et seq.
SLEMROD, supra note 171, at 886.
See SALZBERGER, supra Corporate Governance-Begriff und Aufgaben, in: BRECHT (ed.), Neue Entwicklungen im Rechnungswesen. Prozesse optimieren, Berichtswesen anpassen, Kosten senken, (2005) note 208, at 168.
See KEINAN, supra note 176, at 10. In German law top management is responsible for the proper organization, instruction and supervision of tax compliance work and is liable for the companies’ tax payments if they violate this duty in gross negligence: EICH, Brennpunkt: Steuerhaftung des GmbH-Geschäftsführers, 2005 Kölner Steuerdialog (KÖSDI) 14759, 14764
SLEMROD, supra note 171, at 885.
On the effects of such an invalidation of compensation contracts on internal control efficiency see CHEN/ CHU, supra note 229.
The implications of the geographic and national separation of a company’s activities from its shareholders is also hinted at by FREEDMAN, supra note 179, at 334.
“The good company — A survey of corporate social responsibility”, The Economist, January 22, 2005, 8.
See KPMG, supra note 181, at 5.
BEALE, supra note 180, at 221 et seq.
See e.g. LOITZ, Auswirkungen von Sec. 404 des Sarbanes-Oxley Act auf die Tätigkeit von Steuerabteilungen, 2005 WPg 817, 817. On the implementation in tax departments see 3.3.1 and 3.4.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports (2003) (available at www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8238.htm).
PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD: An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction With an Audit of Financial Statements, approved by the SEC on June 17, 2004.
For details see LOITZ, supra Auswirkungen von Sec. 404 des Sarbanes-Oxley Act auf die Tätigkeit von Steuerabteilungen, 2005 WPg note 271, at 818.
KPMG, supra note 181, at 10.
Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG), April 27, 1998; BGBl. I 1998, 786.
Hüffer, Aktiengesetz, Sec. 91 Stock Companies Act, notes 6 et seq., 9 (6th ed. 2004); HEFERMEHL/SPINDLER, in: KROPFF/SEMLER, Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz, vol. 3, Sec. 91 Stock Companies Act, notes 15 et seq. (2nd ed. 2004).
Gesetz zur Einführung internationaler Rechnungslegungsstandards und zur Sicherung der Qualität der Abschlussprüfung (Bilanzrechtsreformgesetz — BilReG), December 4, 2004, BGBl. I 2004, 3166, 3167.
German Accounting Standard (GAS) 5 — Risk Reporting; see GERMAN ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE, German Accounting Standards, loose-leaf, last update October 2005.
See also COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Preventing and Combating Corporate and Financial Malpractice, COM(2004) 611 final, 7 et seq., and COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union — A Plan to Move Forward, COM(2003) 284 final; BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ, Maßnahmenkatalog der Bundesregierung zur Stärkung der Unternehmensintegrität und des Anlegerschutzes (2003).
See e.g. the various speeches delivered by representatives of the Australian tax administration: www.ato.gov.au/corporate/pathway.asp?pc=001/001/001&cy=1; HAYES, Australia’s Tax Office Sets Out to Link Corporate Governance with Tax Compliance, 2003 Worldwide Tax Daily 208–10; AUSTRALIAN TAXATION OFFICE, supra note 207.
CREST, supra note 212, at 12.
BEALE, supra note 180, at 222, 262 et seq.; BEALE, supra note 236.
KPMG, supra note 181, at 1; VAN BLERCK, Tax Risk Management, 2005 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation (BIFD) 281, 285; SULLIVAN, Reputation or Lower Taxes?, 39 Tax Notes Int’l 896 (2005).
ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 224, at 7; KPMG, supra note 181, at 4 et seq.; CREST, supra note 212, at 11; KEINAN, supra note 176, at 11; KENNEY, Risk Management Moves Corporate Tax Departments to Center Stage, 106 Tax Notes 416 (2005). See also STRATTON, Finance Tax Counsel Addresses Economic Substance Codification, 106 Tax Notes 403 (2005).
BEALE, supra note 180, at 239 et seq., BÜSSOW/TAETZNER, Sarbanes-Oxley Act Sec. 404: Internes Kontrollsystem zur Sicherstellung einer effectiven Finanzberichterstattung im Steuerbereich von Unternehmen — Pflicht oder Kür?, 2005 Betriebs-Berater (BB) 2437; HENDERSON GLOBAL INVESTORS, supra note 210, at 2, 4.
KPMG, supra note 181, at 4.
KPMG, id., at 17; KEINAN, supra note 176, at 10; HENDERSON GLOBAL INVESTORS, supra note 210.
STRATTON, supra note 177.
“Splendid isolation”: KPMG, supra note 181, at 1. See also ERLE, Steuermanagement als Aufgabe des Vorstands?, 2005 Betriebs-Berater, issue 38, I.
KPMG, id., at 3; BEALE, supra note 180, at 220.
BEALE, id., at 246.
KPMG, supra note 181, at 4; KENNEY, supra note 293; THORPE, After the storm, 2005 Tax Business 26, 29 (8/2005). Recognizing little board attention for tax matters: TAX BUSINESS, Unhinged, 2005 Tax Business 40 (9/2005).
See LOITZ, supra Auswirkungen von Sec. 404 des Sarbanes-Oxley Act auf die Tätigkeit von Steuerabteilungen, 2005 WPg note 271, at 826; KEINAN, supra note 176, at 19.
ERLE, supra note 298; HENDERSON GLOBAL INVESTORS, supra note 210.
SALZBERGER, supra Corporate Governance — Begriff und Aufgaben, in: BRECHT (ed.), Neue Entwicklungen im Rechnungswesen. Prozesse optimieren, Berichtswesen anpassen, Kosten senken, (2005) note 208, at 167 et seq., discusses the effect of such codes as a signal to participants in capital markets.
KPMG, supra note 181, at 6.
On the use of corporate policies for signaling see SALZBERGER, supra Corporate Governance — Begriff und Aufgaben, in: BRECHT (ed.), Neue Entwicklungen im Rechnungswesen. Prozesse optimieren, Berichtswesen anpassen, Kosten senken, (2005) note 208, at 167 et seq., who discusses signaling effects towards the capital markets.
HENDERSON GLOBAL INVESTORS, supra note 210, at 7.
See 3.3.1. On the control system demanded by SOX 404 from the perspective of German law see BÜSSOW/TAETZNER, supra Sarbanes-Oxley Act Sec. 404: Internes Kontrollsystem zur Sicherstellung einer effectiven Finanzberichterstattung im Steuerbereich von Unternehmen — Pflicht oder Kür?, 2005 Betriebs-Berater (BB) 2437 note 294; BUDERATH, Auswirkungen des Sarbanes-Oxley-Acts auf die Interne Revision, 2004 Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis (BFuP) 39.
LOITZ, supra Auswirkungen von Sec. 404 des Sarbanes-Oxley Act auf die Tätigkeit von Steuerabteilungen, 2005 WPg note 271, at 821.
COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMMISSION (COSO), Internal Control — Integrated Framework (1994). For further details on the implementation of a control system see LOITZ, id., at 818 et seq., 821 et seq.; HALL/CALLAHAN, Tax and SOX 404, 771 Tax Journal, January 10, 2005, 17; GOODMAN, Internal Controls for the Tax Department, 103 Tax Notes 579 (2004). From a German perspective see BÜSSOW/TAETZNER, supra note 294, at 2439 et seq.
See e.g. the tone-at-the-top aspect of the “control environment”-element of the COSO-framework, COSO, supra note 312.
See 3.4.2.5. See the “information & communication”-element of the COSO-framework, COSO, id.
See 3.4.2.1. See again the “control environment”-element of the COSO-framework, COSO, id.
See 3.4.2.4. See the “risk assessment”-element of the COSO-framework, COSO, id.
With regard to transfer pricing see SILVERMAN/CARMICHAEL/HERR, Sarbanes-Oxley and its implications for transfer pricing, International Tax Review — Tax Reference Library, no 23, 56 (2005).
The COSO-framework has actually been designed with a broader approach in mind: GOODMAN, supra note 312, at 579.
BÜSSOW/ TAETZNER, supra Sarbanes-Oxley Act Sec. 404: Internes Kontrollsystem zur Sicherstellung einer effectiven Finanzberichterstattung im Steuerbereich von Unternehmen — Pflicht oder Kür?, 2005 Betriebs-Berater (BB) note 294, at 2437.
On risk management and corporate governance see SALZBERGER, supra Corporate Governance — Begriff und Aufgaben, in: BRECHT (ed.), Neue Entwicklungen im Rechnungswesen. Prozesse optimieren, Berichtswesen anpassen, Kosten senken, (2005) note 208, at 167 et seq. On a tax risk management framework see VAN BLERCK, supra note 291, who also notes (at 284) that tax risk management shares certain aspects with control systems. On risk management in multinational organizations see ELGOOD/PARROISSIEN/QUIMBY, Managing Global Risk for Multinationals, 2005 Journal of International Taxation 22 (5/2005).
See e.g. KENNEY, supra note 293. VAN BLERCK, supra note 291, at 281 stresses in the light of recent corporate breakdowns: “Business must react to this, not because of compulsion, but because it makes business sense.” See also ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 224, at 4, 6 et seq.
See 3.1. According to VAN BLERCK, supra note 291, at 281, risk comprises the components “uncertainty and exposure”.
See also KPMG, supra note 181, at 10; LOITZ, supra note 271, at 817.
KPMG, id., at 15.
ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 224, at 7 et seq.
SYLVESTER/ TAYLOR, Navigating Corporate Culture and Avoiding U.S. Tax Pitfalls for Multinationals, 37 Tax Notes Int’l 255, 256 (2005).
LOITZ, supra Auswirkungen von Sec. 404 des Sarbanes-Oxley Act auf die Tätigkeit von Steuerabteilungen, 2005 WPg note 271, at 823.
SYLVESTER/ TAYLOR, supra note 327, at 256.
See LOITZ, supra Auswirkungen von Sec. 404 des Sarbanes-Oxley Act auf die Tätigkeit von Steuerabteilungen, 2005 WPg note 271, at 827, pointing out the problem of heterogeneity of information systems.
See ELGOOD/PARROISSIEN/QUIMBY, supra note 321, at 27, who describe such measures for communication with overseas tax departments.
See 3.3; KEINAN, supra note 176, at 10.
CREST, supra note 212, at 11 et seq.
CREST, id.
CREST, id., at 15.
LOITZ, supra Auswirkungen von Sec. 404 des Sarbanes-Oxley Act auf die Tätigkeit von Steuerabteilungen, 2005 WPg note 271, at 828.
KEINAN, supra note 176, at 20 et seq.
ALLEN, Corporate Governance and a Business Lawyer’s Duty of Independence, 38 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2004) further calls for advisors “to exercise independent judgement concerning the detectible spirit animating the law” and not to follow clients in all their demands.
See e.g. 3.4.2.3 and 3.4.2.4. On this aspect see also THORPE, supra note 301, at 29.
On the influence of corporate governance systems on the sensitivity of tax revenues to changes in the tax system see DESAI/DYCK/ZINGALES, supra note 37.
See THORPE, supra note 301, at 29.
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Friese, A., Link, S., Mayer, S. (2008). Taxation and Corporate Governance — The State of the Art. In: Schön, W. (eds) Tax and Corporate Governance. MPI Studies on Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, vol 3. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77276-7_25
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