Abstract
In this research, we propose some group dynamics that promote cooperative behavior in systems with social dilemmas and hence enhances their performance. If cooperative behavior among self-interest individuals is established, effective distribution of resources and useful allocation of tasks based on coalition formation can be realized. In order to realize these group dynamics, we extend the partner choice mechanisms for 2-IPD to that for N-person Dilemma game. Furthermore, we propose group split based on metanorm as a new group dynamic. A series of evolutionary simulations confirm that this group dynamic: i) establishes and maintains cooperation, and ii) enhances the performance of the systems consisting of self-interest players in Social Dilemmas situations.
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Yamashita, T., Izumi, K., Kurumatani, K. (2005). An Investigation into the Use of Group Dynamics for Solving Social Dilemmas. In: Davidsson, P., Logan, B., Takadama, K. (eds) Multi-Agent and Multi-Agent-Based Simulation. MABS 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3415. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-32243-6_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-32243-6_15
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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