Abstract
Graph-theoretic ideas are used to analyze cooperation structures in games. Allocation rules, selecting a payoff for every possible cooperation structure, are studied for games in characteristic function form. Fair allocation rules are defined, and these are proven to be unique, closely related to the Shapley value, and stable for a wide class of games.
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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Myerson, R.B. (2003). Graphs and Cooperation in Games. In: Dutta, B., Jackson, M.O. (eds) Networks and Groups. Studies in Economic Design. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24790-6_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24790-6_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-07719-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-24790-6
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