Abstract
This essay treats the development of Foot’s efforts to produce a naturalistic theory of moral judgement from her early “Moral Beliefs” (1958) to her 2001 book Natural Goodness. Although she consistently attempts to isolate and defend a notion of goodness that is grounded in goodness in living things, she is not attempting to get ethics out of biology, especially not evolutionary biology: “species/life-form” in her and Thompson is the everyday concept not the specialised evolutionary theory one. She is just making a claim about the conceptual structure, or grammar, of our moral evaluations of ourselves being the same as the structure of our evaluations of other living things. How then does she cope with the is-ought gap? She rethinks our practical reason just as a faculty like our sight and hearing, which can be, or fail to be, in good working order in a good, or defective, human being. Viewed this way, discriminating recognition of pleasure/the satisfaction of desire as a reason and recognition of self-interest as a reason, and following each when appropriate, are both involved in the faculty’s being in good working order. And so is the discriminating recognition and following of the reasons that pertain to the virtues. She is claiming and not denying that we are a very special sort of living thing. We are human rational agents and when we evaluate ourselves as such, which we do in moral judgements, everything undergoes a “sea change.” So she is espousing the sort of naturalism that McDowell describes as “the radical and satisfying alternative to subjectivism and supernaturalism,” not his other “natural-scientific” sort.
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Hursthouse, R. (2018). The Grammar of Goodness in Foot’s Ethical Naturalism. In: Hacker-Wright, J. (eds) Philippa Foot on Goodness and Virtue. Philosophers in Depth. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91256-1_2
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