Christine Korsgaard and the Normativity of Practical Identities

Abstract

According to Christine Korsgaard’s account of practical identity, we as human agents are not only bound by the normativity of moral necessity but also addressees of strict claims that are grounded in our own individual personality. Thus, any agent would—at least in principle—be entitled to say “Here I stand I can do no other—because I am me.” Why does Korsgaard hold that “being yourself” should have any strict normative implications? What kind of normativity is involved here? Bambauer comes to the conclusion that Korsgaard justifies the practical necessity of being a person—of being somebody—but she does not justify being me or being you. This is problematic, since the alleged normativity of duties, which are grounded in our particular identities, requires the strict normativity of these specific identities. Furthermore, following Korsgaard’s theory, strict practical necessity is grounded in our rational nature (our capacity to act), and only those principles and norms that enable us to act are strictly binding for us because they enable us to act. While Korsgaard may be justified in inferring the strict normativity of certain reasons from their action-constitutive function, it remains unclear why sharing certain reasons with another person in a deep way should imply a normative status similar to moral reasons. This holds since relationship-based reasons are not shown to be constitutive of action. As Bambauer finally points out, this is indicative of a structural inconsistency of Korsgaard’s theory of practical identities.