Abstract
In this paper I advocate a version of selective epistemological realism. I begin with analyzing the conditions in which a scientific model successfully and correctly represents an identified target. I stress that the realistic import of models rests on the truth of some predicative statements. I then examine the notions of objectivity and truth in order to be able to assess the reasons to believe in the existence of some unobserved objects posited by our best scientific theories and in the truth of some assertions about the properties that these objects possess. I distinguish between the properties that are observable in principle by means of instruments which enhance our perceptive capacities (the OP properties) and the properties that are beyond any possible observation by us, namely the properties which are purely theoretical (the PT properties), such as charm and strangeness in elementary particle physics. The OP properties are identical or similar to the observed properties of ordinary perceived things, such as velocity, volume and, admittedly more controversially, charge and mass. I propose four stringent requirements for rationally believing that an unobserved object posited by a theory possesses a specific property. Firstly, this property must be an OP property. Secondly, it must be measurable. Thirdly, it must play a causal role in producing the observed data. Fourthly, distinct independent methods for measuring this property must deliver concordant results. I then show that the generality and acceptability of these four criteria is grounded on a parallelism with the reasons we adduce for (rightly) believing in the existence of ordinary observable things which we don’t immediately perceive such as mice, in some circumstances. However, an agnostic attitude is to be recommended with respect to the possession of PT properties by an object posited by an—even successful—scientific theory.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Mental ideas, whatever their status, exist as mental entities and can be the target of scientific investigation.
- 3.
More on this in Ghins (2016b).
- 4.
- 5.
A homomorphism is a function which preserves the form or the structure but is not necessarily bijective. As a particular case of homomorphism, an isomorphism is a one-one correspondence between two sets. See Suppes (2002, 56).
- 6.
Zalta’s abstract objects are individuals which both encode and exemplify properties. They aren’t Agazzi’s abstract objects. For Zalta, when a concrete object has all the properties encoded by the abstract object, it is a physical “correlate” of the abstract object (See Ghins 2016a).
- 7.
Although the targets of our representations are things, we represent only some aspects of them, that is, structures or objects (see Ghins 2010).
- 8.
The word «phenomenon» inevitably suggests something that appears to me or us, whereas the word “thing” immediately makes us think of something in the external world.
- 9.
See Agazzi (2014, 194).
- 10.
See also Ghins (2010, 527).
- 11.
For a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses on the NMA, see for example Alai (2012).
- 12.
The OP properties attributed to molecules certainly are theoretical, since they belong to objects posited by a theory. This is why I use the adjective “purely” to refer to theoretical properties which are beyond any possibility of indirect observation.
- 13.
Mario Alai (2010, 672) mentions a method of measurement used by Perrin to determine the upper limit for the size of molecules, which relies solely on an inductive inference.
- 14.
Admittedly, an OP property often plays a causal role together with some PT properties. Each requirement is necessary but none of them is sufficient in isolation.
- 15.
See Maxwell (1962, 7).
- 16.
See Nola (2008).
- 17.
A causal law is a mathematical law containing a time derivative which refers to the effect, whereas the other terms refer to the cause(s) . (Blondeau and Ghins 2012).
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Ghins, M. (2017). Selective Scientific Realism: Representation, Objectivity and Truth. In: Agazzi, E. (eds) Varieties of Scientific Realism. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51608-0_6
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