Abstract
The empirically oriented research tradition of network governance has not yet made use of laboratory experiments. Nevertheless, experimental investigation can complement a systematic analysis in two central aspects. On the one hand, experimental tools have been used to study network formation. On the other hand, experimental research has created knowledge about power distributions in networks. A profound understanding of how specific networks are formed and how network structures influence power relations has the potential to improve systematic examination in the field. This chapter relates the aforementioned literature to governance networks and lays the groundwork for potential future contributions of experimental research to network governance.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
For an exception, see, for example, Gluesing et al. (2016).
- 4.
The benefits depend, for example, on the network structure, which will be discussed in the following section. As no bargaining takes place here, the power aspect in network-formation models is typically neglected. However, models include externalities of connections affecting other network members. Also, there are some experiments, which we will discuss later, in which the connection yields no direct payoff. In this case, the link allows the actors to play a game to create payoffs.
- 5.
Networks are described in different ways in the fields discussed in this chapter, for example, by reference to the number of nodes, the number of links, or the overall pattern (such as a line or a kite). At the risk of generating some ambivalence in terminology, we stick to the labels used by the original authors.
- 6.
These variations parallel the tradeoff between external costs and decision costs introduced by Buchanan and Tullock (1962).
- 7.
Note that in this model agents do not base their decision on reciprocity but only on their own rationality and that of other agents.
- 8.
Bargaining does not imply the division of some kind of profit (points, money) per se. Also, tasks or responsibilities can be divided between organizations.
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Schwaninger, M., Neuhofer, S., Kittel, B. (2017). Contributions of Experimental Research to Network Governance. In: Hollstein, B., Matiaske, W., Schnapp, KU. (eds) Networked Governance. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50386-8_11
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