Abstract
This chapter analyzes the complex ways in which new norms and standards emerge out of multi-stakeholder initiatives when stakeholders have conflicting interests. We present a team game-theoretical framework in which players can switch between two kinds of reasoning: an individual mode in which stakeholders aim for the best possible outcome for themselves and a “we-mode” in which they are genuinely concerned with finding a standard that is optimal for the whole group. We show that a higher inclination towards “we-mode” reasoning is beneficial overall and maximizes individual payoffs and the outcome for the entire group. We argue that cooperation is therefore in the rational self-interest of stakeholders; it is not just desirable from a vague moral perspective. We conclude that in a world where national regulatory frameworks are losing their grip, only norms that have been worked out by a sufficiently large number of “we-reasoning” stakeholders can be called legitimate.
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Krause, J., Scholz, M. (2016). Erosion of Sovereign Control: Deliberation, ‘We-Reasoning,’ and the Legitimacy of Norms and Standards in a Globalized World. In: Coutinho de Arruda, M., Rok, B. (eds) Understanding Ethics and Responsibilities in a Globalizing World. The International Society of Business, Economics, and Ethics Book Series, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23081-8_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23081-8_5
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