Abstract
This chapter contextualizes the debate on the right to be forgotten, taking into account cultural and social science considerations of forgetting on the Internet. On this basis, it is shown how forgetting in general and the right to be forgotten in particular can be meaningfully constructed from a legal perspective. The right to be forgotten as described in the present contribution can be located in various areas of law, whereby data protection law and press law are of particular importance. The chapter tries to clarify how the two areas can be appropriately related to each other in the case of the right to be forgotten. Using the ‘media privilege’ is proposed as a kind of coordination mechanism that applies the area of law best suited to the medium in question. The aim of this approach is to arrive at the most differentiated standards for assessing the legality of public statements on the Internet and also for applying the right to be forgotten.
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Notes
- 1.
There have been numerous publications worldwide. See for the Brazilian debate for example Sarlet (2022), in this volume, Gonçalves (2020) and Blum (2013). In Europe, several doctoral projects have been published: Gstrein (2016), Diesterhöft (2014); Weismantel (2017), Becker (2019). See for a comparative perspective the contributions in Werro (2020).
- 2.
ECJ, decision of 13.5.2014—C-131/12.
- 3.
Sarlet (2022), in this volume.
- 4.
The debate is often traced back to Mayer-Schönberger (2011). However, earlier approaches to forgetting and the right to be forgotten existed prior to it. See for a short overview Koops (2012), p. 2. Many authors disagree with the terminology. See for the German debate inter alia Hornung and Hofmann (2013), p. 170; Kühling (2014), p. 530; Spiecker gen. Döhmann (2014), p. 35. Spiecker points out that she uses the term anyway because it has now become established. See also Sarlet (2022), Sect. 1, in this volume.
- 5.
Hornung and Hofmann (2013), p. 170.
- 6.
- 7.
Koreng and Feldmann (2012), p. 315.
- 8.
A detailed analysis of its content is given by Hornung and Hofmann (2013).
- 9.
ECJ, decision of 13.5.2014—C-131/12.
- 10.
See for example BGH, decision of 13.11.2012—VI ZR 330/11. The online archive cases are comparable to the droit à l’oubli in French law and the diritto al’oblio in Italian law. An overview of the different traditions and their relationships to US approaches is given by Bernal (2014).
- 11.
BVerfG, decision of 6.11.2019—1 BvR 16/13=NJW 2020, 300–314; BVerfG, decision of 6.11.2019—1 BvR 276/17=NJW 2020, 314–328.
- 12.
See for a detailed analysis of the judgment Stehmeier and Schimke (2014).
- 13.
A brief overview of the jurisprudence is provided by Trentmann (2016).
- 14.
See for the Brazilian debate Sarlet (2022), in this volume; see for an early analysis of the US debate Bernal (2014); a suggestion for a differentiated approach to the construction of the right to be forgotten that is globally viable is made by Jones (2016); see for the German debate Weismantel (2017), Diesterhöft (2014), and Stumpf (2017); Gstrein (2016) deals with the right to be forgotten as a human right.
- 15.
The argumentation of Koreng and Feldmann (2012) follows this assumption.
- 16.
- 17.
Grimm (2013), p. 589.
- 18.
Diesterhöft (2014), p. 23.
- 19.
Mayer-Schönberger (2011).
- 20.
Diesterhöft (2014a), p. 371.
- 21.
Buchholtz (2015), p. 126. In the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision on the right to be forgotten it becomes clear that this is not necessarily relevant from a constitutional perspective. See BVerfG, decision of 6.11.2019—1 BvR 16/13=NJW 2020, 300–314, para 104 ff.
- 22.
Spiecker genannt Döhmann (2014).
- 23.
Spiecker genannt Döhmann (2014).
- 24.
- 25.
- 26.
Weismantel (2017), p. 134, offers a legal definition of the right to be forgotten. According to this definition, the right to be forgotten is a right to deletion or isolation of personal data on the Internet which should no longer be accessible because they are no longer relevant, either in modal or in temporal terms (Weismantel (2017) p. 122). This definition, however, is less a definition of the right to be forgotten but rather a description of the legal answer to the problem raised by the Google-Spain decision. It therefore focuses too much on the constellation of an Internet search engine, whereas the discussion on the right to be forgotten addresses more far-reaching aspects as well. For a criticism of definitions that focus too strongly on the Internet constellations in general, see also Sarlet (2022), Sect. 2.1, in this volume.
- 27.
- 28.
Assmann (2010), p. 11.
- 29.
Assmann (2010), p. 19.
- 30.
Assmann (2010), p. 20.
- 31.
See also for the following description Assmann (2010), p. 27.
- 32.
Assmann (2010), p. 21.
- 33.
Assmann (2016), p. 217.
- 34.
Assmann (2016), p. 217.
- 35.
Assmann (2016), p. 216.
- 36.
Assmann (2016), p. 216.
- 37.
Esposito (2017), p. 6.
- 38.
Esposito (2002), p. 38.
- 39.
Esposito (2002), p. 9.
- 40.
Esposito (2002), p. 9.
- 41.
Esposito (2002), p. 27.
- 42.
Esposito (2002), p. 27.
- 43.
Esposito (2002), p. 27.
- 44.
Esposito (2002), p. 33.
- 45.
See also for the following example Esposito (2002), p. 38.
- 46.
See for the following description of the web-memory Esposito (2017).
- 47.
Albers (2005), p. 87.
- 48.
- 49.
This is also highlighted by the Federal Constitutional Court. S. BVerfG, decision of 6.11.2019—1 BvR 16/13=NJW 2020, 300–314, para 131.
- 50.
ECJ, decision of 13.5.2014—C-131/12, para 72–75.
- 51.
- 52.
BVerfG, decision of 5.6.1973—1 BvR 536/72=NJW 1973, p. 1226 (Lebach I); BVerfG, decision of 25.11.1999—1 BvR 348/98, 1 BvR 755/98=ZUM-RD 2000, p. 55.
- 53.
BVerfG, decision of 5.6.1973—1 BvR 536/72=NJW 1973, p. 1231.
- 54.
BVerfG, decision of 25.11.1999—1 BvR 348/98, 1 BvR 755/98=ZUM-RD 2000, p. 59.
- 55.
An overview on and an analysis of the jurisdiction is provided by Théry (2016).
- 56.
See for a summary of the different approaches Trentmann (2016).
- 57.
BVerfG, decision of 6.11.2019—1 BvR 16/13=NJW 2020, 300–314.
- 58.
„Die Möglichkeit des Vergessens gehört zur Zeitlichkeit der Freiheit“ (BVerfG, decision of 6.11.2019—1 BvR 16/13=NJW 2020, 300–314, para 105).
- 59.
BVerfG, decision of 6.11.2019—1 BvR 16/13=NJW 2020, 300–314, para 108.
- 60.
BVerfG, decision of 6.11.2019—1 BvR 16/13=NJW 2020, 300–314, para 112.
- 61.
BVerfG, decision of 6.11.2019—1 BvR 16/13=NJW 2020, 300–314, para 112 f.
- 62.
See also for the following summary BVerfG, decision of 6.11.2019—1 BvR 16/13=NJW 2020, 300–314, para 116 ff.
- 63.
Wagner (2017), para 364.
- 64.
That does not mean that it does not have any structural effects for future communications.
- 65.
Not that long ago the German Federal Court of Justice decided on Google’s liability for its search results under German press law, using the legal construct of ‘reasonable inspection obligations’: BGH, decision of 27.02.2018—VI ZR 489/16. Further details on the concept of being a ‘Störer’ are provided below in Sect. 4.3. However, this has been modified by now due to a new consideration of the relationship between European and German law in this context. See BGH, decision of 27.7.2020—VI ZR 405/18. The Court now only applies Article 17 GDPR and the GDPR’s liability regime.
- 66.
A similar provision can be found in Article 7 of the Brazilian Data Protection Law. For a thorough analysis of Art. 6 GDPR see Albers and Veit (2021).
- 67.
ECJ, decision of 13.5.2014—C-131/12, para 93–95.
- 68.
BVerG, decision of 6.11.2019—1 BvR 276/17=NJW 2020, 314–328, para 95; BVerfG, decision of 6.11.2019—1 BvR 16/13=NJW 2020, 300–314, para 41 ff.
- 69.
ECJ, decision of 13.5.2014—C 131/12, para 98.
- 70.
Therefore, in my understanding, the right to deletion on the grounds of Article 17(1) GDPR itself can in certain constellations be a form of the right to be forgotten. In the German literature on Article 17 GDPR, however, the right to be forgotten is generally identified in Article 17(2) GDPR, which provides for certain information duties once a right to deletion has been asserted. See inter alia Herbst (2021), para 49.
- 71.
See for the underlying concept Albers (2005) and Albers (2014). See for the understanding of the BDSG as a framework for regulating data processing processes Albers (2012), p. 164. See for the construction of the right for data protection as a fundamental right at the European level Reinhardt (2022), in this volume. In its recent decision on the right to be forgotten, the Federal Constitutional Court also tends to identify informational self-determination with framework-regulation. Nevertheless, its underlaying understanding is different and much more oriented towards an individual-rights approach where the right to informational self-determination is relevant in situation of automated, non-public data processing: BVerfG, decision of 6.11.2010—1 BvR 16/13=NJW 2020, 300–314, para 83 ff.
- 72.
However, the regulations serve their own goods and are not only preventive measures. See Franzius (2015b), p. 266.
- 73.
See for the different elements in detail Albers (2012), p. 181.
- 74.
Security measures are handled in Chap. IV, Section 2 GDPR.
- 75.
In this respect Article 25 GDPR is an important provision.
- 76.
A detailed analysis of the principle of purpose limitation is given by von Grafenstein (2018). The principle of purpose limitation can be found in Article 5(1) b GDPR.
- 77.
The principle of necessity can be found inter alia in the various legal grounds for the processing of personal data in Article 6 GDPR.
- 78.
The rights of the data subject can be found in Chapter III GDPR.
- 79.
Chapter IV GDPR.
- 80.
However, Article 6(1) f GDPR provides for the possibility of considering interests of third parties within the weighing process. See in detail for the weighing process in Article 6(1) f GDPR Buchner and Petri (2021), para 149–154.
- 81.
Simitis (2018), p. 214.
- 82.
Buchner and Petri (2021), para 148.
- 83.
Article 9(1) GDPR reads as follows: “Processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union memberships, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.” Article 9(2) GDPR provides for exemptions from this general prohibition of processing special categories of data, but none of these exemptions is adapted to public communication situations in old or new media.
- 84.
This approach has been criticized in the legal literature. See inter alia Spindler (2012), p. 99.
- 85.
See for claims on the grounds of Section 1004 BGB analogously in general Baldus (2017), para 307.
- 86.
See for a brief explanation Spindler and Volkmann (2015), para 5–18.
- 87.
Permanent case law. See for a decision with respect to Internet search engines BGH, decision of 27.02.2018—VI ZR 489/16, para 31.
- 88.
The relation is explained by the BVerfG in a detailed manner in its decisions on the right to be forgotten: BVerfG, decisions of 6.11.2019—1 BvR 16/13, 1 BvR 276/17=NJW 2020, 300–314, 314–328. In these decisions the court also clarified that constitutional complaints can not only be based on German fundamental rights but also on rights guaranteed in the CFR. An overview over this aspect of the decisions is provided by Kühling (2020).
- 89.
Lauber-Rönsberg (2014), p. 179.
- 90.
Herbst (2021), para 37.
- 91.
Similarly Lauber-Rönsberg (2014), pp. 181 ff.
- 92.
An example of the application of data protection law is the spickmich decision of the BGH: BGH, decision of 23.6.2009, VI ZR 196/09; an example of the focus on press law is the autocomplete decision of the BGH: BGH, decision of 14.5.2013, VI ZR 269/12; an example of the application of both regimes is a recent BGH decision dealing with the results list of Internet search engines: BGH, decision of 27.2.2018, VI ZR 489/16.
- 93.
Lauber-Rönsberg (2014), p. 182.
- 94.
Lauber-Rönsberg (2014), pp. 178 ff.
- 95.
LG Saarbrücken, decision of 23.11.2017—4 O 328/17=ZUM-RD 2018, pp. 115–122.
- 96.
„Sie wollten doch Deutschland verlassen. Warum lösen Sie Ihr Versprechen nicht endlich ein. Ihr Demokratieverständnis und Ihr Wortschatz widern mich an. MFG “(cited according to LG Saarbrücken, decision of 23.11.2017—4 O 328/17=ZUM-RD 2018, p.115).
- 97.
„hey schnuffi…! Date!? nur wir beide? […]“ (cited according to LG Saarbrücken, decision of 23.11.2017—4 O 328/17=ZUM-RD 2018, p. 115).
- 98.
LG Saarbrücken, decision of 23.11.2017—4 O 328/17=ZUM-RD 2018, p. 118.
- 99.
LG Saarbrücken, decision of 23.11.2017—4 O 328/17=ZUM-RD 2018, p. 118.
- 100.
LG Saarbrücken, decision of 23.11.2017—4 O 328/17=ZUM-RD 2018, p. 118.
- 101.
LG Saarbrücken, decision of 23.11.2017—4 O 328/17=ZUM-RD 2018, p. 118.
- 102.
LG Saarbrücken, decision of 23.11.2017—4 O 328/17=ZUM-RD 2018, p. 118.
- 103.
LG Saarbrücken, decision of 23.11.2017—4 O 328/17=ZUM-RD 2018, p. 119.
- 104.
LG Saarbrücken, decision of 23.11.2017—4 O 328/17=ZUM-RD 2018, p. 120.
- 105.
LG Saarbrücken, decision of 23.11.2017—4 O 328/17=ZUM-RD 2018, p. 120.
- 106.
LG Saarbrücken, decision of 23.11.2017—4 O 328/17=ZUM-RD 2018, p. 120.
- 107.
See for example its considerations on the plaintiff’s protected interest that her private message should not be published with respect to its content (and not with respect to the publication of the plaintiff’s name): LG Saarbrücken, decision of 23.11.2017—4 O 328/17=ZUM-RD 2018, p. 117 and p. 119.
- 108.
Both public spheres are—as the reproduction of the communication by the plaintiff shows—connected with each other, and content can quickly be switched back and forth between the two. This is an expression of the liquefied form of networked communication. The liquefaction of communication does not mean, however, that a distinction cannot be made between different publics. Cf. Ladeur's note on the liquefaction of communication in this case in Ladeur (2018), p. 122.
- 109.
Buchner and Tinnefeld (2021), para 13.
- 110.
A detailed overview of the German laws and of the debates surrounding their understanding in relation to Article 85 GDPR is given by Cornils (2018).
- 111.
Buchner and Tinnefeld (2021), para 18.
- 112.
Lauber-Rönsberg (2014), p. 179.
- 113.
Stender-Vorwachs and Lauber-Rönsberg (2021), para ff.
- 114.
See for an overview Lauber-Rönsberg (2014).
- 115.
BGH, decision of 23.6.2009, VI ZR 196/09.
- 116.
ECJ, decision of 13.5.2014—C-131/12.
- 117.
BGH, decision of 23.6.2009, VI ZR 196/09, para 21.
- 118.
BGH, decision of 23.6.2009, VI ZR 196/09, para 19.
- 119.
ECJ, decision of 13.5.2014—C-131/12, para 85.
- 120.
ECJ, decision of 16.12.2008 -73/07, para 61.
- 121.
Buchner and Tinnefeld (2021), para 24.
- 122.
The fact that a public is addressed by the publication is emphasized inter alia by Herb (2018) para 13c.
- 123.
A differentiated study focusing on the role of intermediaries in the process of opinion formation in Germany is provided by Schmidt et al. (2017).
- 124.
Similar Ladeur (2020), 142.
- 125.
See above, Sect. 8.4.4.
- 126.
ECJ, decision of 16.12.2008 -73/07, para 62.
- 127.
This criterion also provides a possible differentiation between the word ‘opinion’ in Article 85(1) 1 GDPR—which says that the Member States should adapt their laws to the Regulation in the field of the freedom of opinion—and Article 85(2) GDPR. Article 85(2) GDPR is in my understanding geared towards communication situations where content is mediated to a (sub)-public, whereas Article 85(1) GDPR focuses more on the content of a message and also includes situations where content is transferred between two parties. See for the relationship between Article 85(1) GDPR and Article 85(2) GDPR and the consequences the possible interpretations have for the relationship of press law and data protection law in the field of pictures containing natural persons Lauber-Rönsberg and Hartlaub (2017).
- 128.
Similar Michel (2018), p. 837.
- 129.
An overview is provided by Simitis (2014).
- 130.
Simitis (2014), p. 205.
- 131.
Albers (2005).
- 132.
Simitis (2014), p. 208.
- 133.
- 134.
Franzius (2015a), p. 263.
- 135.
Albers (2005), p. 156.
- 136.
Albers (2005), p. 87.
- 137.
Albers (2005), especially p. 451, p. 600.
- 138.
Albers (2005), p. 590.
- 139.
See in detail for the different dimension of the Allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht as a protected good in press law Wagner (2017).
- 140.
Another possibility could be to distinguish between public and non-public communication. This pressuposes a legal understanding of „public“ in the overlapping area of press law and data protection law. This division is applied by the Federal Consitutional Court in its decisions on the right to be forgotten. See particularly BVerfG, decision of 6.11.2019—1 BvR 16/13=NJW 2020. 300–314, para 82 ff.
- 141.
Suggestions are made inter alia by Ladeur (2014).
- 142.
Lauber-Rönsberg (2014), p. 1058 therefore classifies press law as a sub-category of data protection law.
- 143.
- 144.
A general overview of the relationship between European law and the law of the Member States with respect to the fundamental rights dimension is given by Franzius (2015a).
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Schimke, A. (2022). Forgetting as a Social Concept. Contextualizing the Right to Be Forgotten. In: Albers, M., Sarlet, I.W. (eds) Personality and Data Protection Rights on the Internet. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 96. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90331-2_8
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