Abstract
Safety-critical systems are systems that cannot be allowed to fail. Such systems, if they fail, may cause economic damage or even loss of life. As a result, bug-fixes and patches are routinely applied to traditional software. But such updates are rarely feasible in safety-critical systems. In this paper, we introduce how formal verification has been applied to verify safety-critical systems. We will also show how model checking can be used to unearth deficiencies in a system and then improve it, by applying it to an airbag system - which is one of the most common safety critical systems we use everyday. Finally we propose an improved design of such a system with added redundancy, that is more robust to faults.
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Guha, S., Nag, A., Karmakar, R. (2021). Formal Verification of Safety-Critical Systems: A Case-Study in Airbag System Design. In: Abraham, A., Piuri, V., Gandhi, N., Siarry, P., Kaklauskas, A., Madureira, A. (eds) Intelligent Systems Design and Applications. ISDA 2020. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 1351. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71187-0_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71187-0_10
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