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1 Introduction. Social Change and Unintended Effects: A Classic Combination

Since the pioneering work of Robert K. Merton in the 1930s, the topic of the unwanted and unanticipated outcomes of human actions has established itself as a central issue in sociological thought. The very notion of unforeseen consequences of purposive social action has a long-standing and relevant tradition in sociology. It stems from Weber’s “Sociology of the Paradox of Consequences” (Cherkaoui, 2007, p. 1). In Popper’s opinion, “the characteristic problems of the social sciences arise only out of our wish to know the unintended consequences of human actions”—which means that “the real task of social sciences is to explain those things which nobody wants” (Popper, 1962, pp. 123–124).

As has been noted, such unintended repercussions of social action are present “everywhere in social life,” thus representing one of the “fundamental causes of social imbalances and of social change” (Boudon, 1982, p. 1). The latter, in fact, often proceeds by tortuous paths and counterintuitive connections, neither plotted nor designed:

  • The enhanced cultivation of modern science was inadvertently triggered by Pietistic values and religious sentiments (see Cohen, 1990; Merton, 1970), in such a manner that “secularization was the unintended outcome of the religiously motivated science of the Seventeenth century” (Shapin, 1988, p. 601).

  • In liberal industrial societies, a decrease in inequality of educational opportunities could ironically cause worsening inequality in terms of social opportunities and social mobility (see Boudon, 1974).

  • The 1986 Immigration Control Act, a US act designed to control and reduce immigration, eventually increased it substantially in the following decade (Portes, 2000, pp. 5–6).

  • The current female population deficit in China has been an unintended (even though easily anticipated) consequence of the one-child policy, introduced by the Chinese government to curb population growth (de Zwart, 2015, pp. 291–292).

This selected list of random examples can easily be extended—possibly even endlessly (in this regard, see Mica, 2018). However, we must observe that the importance of the unintended by-products of social transformations, emphasized as they were by many social scientists, had served as a focal point, especially for the sociological project of Ulrich Beck. According to him, the history of modernity (actually, its very definition) is deeply marked by the impact of unintended changes and accidental alterations. “Reflexive modernization conceptualizes the motive power of social change in categories of the side-effect” (Beck, 1997, p. 38), to the extent that “the motor of social transformation is no longer considered to be instrumental rationality, but rather the side-effect” (Beck, 1997, p. 23). This implies that the age in which we live should be sociologically theorized, first and foremost, as “the age of side-effects” (Beck, 1994).Footnote 1

Needless to say, a fully detailed examination of Ulrich Beck’s approach would be far beyond the scope of our analysis. Based on Beck’s sociological theory, the goal of this chapter is to point out a specific implication of the role of unintended dynamics in social change: what Albert O. Hirschman called “blessings in disguise”Footnote 2—the concept of emancipatory catastrophism. This concept refers to the hidden emancipatory side effects of global risk. Beck’s argument is that modern environmental catastrophes may ironically have the potential to bring about major, constructive changes in the way social actors organize their lives and societies. In other words, extreme “bad” harbors the potential to create normative horizons of common “good,” stimulating reflection on questions of justice. “This process of ‘social catharsis’ can facilitate the development of new normative horizons and has the potential to reconfigure cultural practices” (Mythen, 2017, p. 25). Before tackling and discussing the issue of emancipatory catastrophism in detail, it might be useful to take a step back, and briefly examine the relationship between individual aims, aggregate outcome, and compositional mechanisms, which provide the logical foundation of Beck’s point of view.

2 Individual Intentions, Latent Functions, and Transformational Mechanisms

At the core of the concept of unforeseen effects lies a clear-cut dichotomy: on the one hand, there is the perception of the social actors regarding their own actions (i.e., the “subjective side” of their behavior: beliefs, reasons, aims, conscious elements—what the actors think their actions are); on the other hand, there are the actions themselves—their actual ramifications (i.e., the objective meaning of the actors’ behaviors). In fact, the classic distinction between “manifest” and “latent” functions was devised “to preclude the inadvertent confusion between conscious motivations for social behavior and its objective consequences” (Merton, 1968, p. 114).

Thus, emphasizing the importance of what is unintended and unforeseen means “interpreting data by establishing their consequences for larger structures in which they are implicated” (Merton, 1968, p. 101), so the functionalistic focus is on the manifold impact that individual behavior has on the broader social, cultural, and political context. As a direct result of discriminating between the purposive and planned outcomes and the unexpected and unplanned outcomes of social activities, the relationship between the social and the individual levels, between the whole and its parts, becomes more complicated, and so does the road from past to future. Firstly, from the perspective of social change, the pervasive role of latent functions entails the impracticability of transposing micro-sociological data on a macro-sociological level and vice versa, i.e., the infeasibility of assuming that a given phenomenon “occurs because individuals behave in such a way as to bring it about” (Boudon, 1986, p. 59). And since small changes in the structure of social interaction can have “a profound impact on the social outcomes that emerge, (…) aggregate social patterns typically say very little about the micro-level processes that brought them about” (Hedström, 2005, p. 149). It happens, therefore, that local problems are globalized, and—conversely—global problems are localized; seemingly irrelevant small-scale things influence larger-scale things and back again; axiologically negative phenomena engender an axiologically positive state of things, and the other way around. The original scope of social phenomena (what they are initially intended to be) matters little for their effective consequences (what they actually turn out to be), since mass effect implies processes and transformations “which deny or contradict pristine motives and intentions” on which they are based (Turner, 1996, p. 178). Moreover, unlike personal reasons, “functions are never intrinsic” because “they are assigned relative to the interests of users and observers” (Searle, 1997, p. 19).

As is clear, all these are variations on the central theme variously called “accumulation,” “emergence,” “composition,” or “aggregation”—all concepts that articulate the indirect, oblique, tortuous (that is, unintended) way through which social results shape individual behavior. Although it is not as widely acknowledged as it should be, the need (and maybe the necessity) to deploy such concepts is due precisely to the impossibility of investigating social phenomena by trying to identify who wanted them or who endeavored to make them happen: that is, the impossibility of giving an intentional explanation of social outcomes.Footnote 3 If notions of “emergence” or “composition” are ubiquitous in sociological literature, it is because they are indispensable for explaining the undeniable presence of things which nobody looked for within social reality. Ultimately, as has already been stated, late modernity itself “is not an intentional process. It is a process of cumulative unintended side effects that eventually produce a change in fundamental social principles. These are often effects that were originally intended to be narrower in scope than they turned out to be” (Beck & Willms, 2004, p. 29. See also Perelman, 2015).Footnote 4

In this respect, the aim of “conceiving the action in a way that makes it rational from the point of view of the actor” (Coleman, 1990, p. 18) seems to be of little help for analyzing unintended macro-effects, since rationality is a category that pertains mainly to individual actors, and, as such, it cannot properly account for those opaque cause-effect chains in which aims and effects are unrelated or unassociated. As Coleman (1990, p. 6) himself observed, after all, “the major problem for explanations of system behavior based on actions at a level below that of the system is that of moving from the lower level to the system level”. Indeed, it is precisely at this point—the point where “transformational mechanisms” become operative and effective (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998, p. 23; Ylikoski, 2017, p. 403)—that the importance of unintended consequences displays itself. Transformational means nothing more than a change of some sort that arises in the “black box” type shift from the individual/past/purposive to the collective/future/unplanned level. As argued by John Goldthorpe (2007, p. 129), however, the “analytic primacy in sociology lies with the consequences of individual action”: if sociologists confine themselves to highlighting intentional causal relations, they would not be able, by definition, to develop sound theories that explore the emergence of unplanned macro-social phenomena, thus betraying one of sociology’s most distinctive (even though sometimes underrated: see Mica, 2017) missions.

Based on the above, this chapter underscores the point that social actions that are more influential in producing positive global consequences or desirable macro-effects are neither made for this purpose nor felt as such—in fact, often the contrary. Phenomena that initially seemed narrowly and blindly local, without any well-defined project and with no regard for their future consequences, are often those that later end up having the greatest impacts and the most enduring effects.

3 Learning the Hard Way. The Circuitous Ways of Sustainability, or How Devastating Events Might Save Modernity

A mechanism that contributes much to the dynamic of cultural and social change is that by which “activities oriented toward certain values release processes which so react as to change the very scale of values which precipitated them” (Merton, 1936, p. 903). Merton believes that this is “the essential paradox of social action,” already recognized in Goethe’s Faust, with the reference to the power which eternally wants evil and eternally does good. For example, it might well happen that “micro-pathologies” (i.e., an overstressing of individuals’ adaptive capacities) could lead to “macro-normality” (i.e., an increase of society’s adaptive capabilities), and vice versa (Hondrich, 1987)—a process completely unrelated to those purposes, projects, and designs that initially moved and oriented social actors.

It is in this respect that Ulrich Beck has recently written about “emancipatory catastrophism,” the “positive” reformation of modes of thought, of lifestyles and consumer habits, of law, economy, science, and politics (thus essentially a reformation of society as a whole) triggered by such a negative thing as global climate change, a counterintuitive dynamic that highlights “the dramatic power of the unintended, unseen emancipatory side effects of global risk” (Beck, 2015a, p. 79). The underlying idea is that global warming has the power to change social actors, and for the better. The continuous increase of temperature, the Polar ice melting, the cumulation of extreme weather events, the decrease in freshwater availability, the high rates of biodiversity loss—all of this could be viewed as a unique opportunity to profoundly transform people’s way of being in the world. The full realization of certain (objectionable and dangerous) values, exacerbating their contradictions, may eventually lead to their (beneficial) renunciation. In this light, common “good” is conceived of as a by-product of “bad” premises: “Haven’t climate scientists set in train a transformation of capitalism that is destructive of nature, a transformation that was long overdue, but seemed impossible before?” (Beck, 2016, p. 117). It is not necessary to completely endorse the claim that “global climate risk could usher in a rebirth of modernity” (Beck, 2016, p. 117) in order to see that certain undoubtedly constructive and definitely unprecedented social phenomena (e.g., environmentalism, sustainability, ethical activism, degrowth movements, etc.) have been brought about as a direct consequence of some destructive developments, initially as mere reactive responses, then like entirely autonomous phenomena. Bitter pills may indeed have blessed effects.

The global climate risk to humanity has (despite all the pessimism in the face of the failure of adequate political answers and actions) already invested the postmodern “everything-goes” philosophy with a new—if not utopian, then dystopian—meaning. Paradoxically, global climate risks have given us new orientations, new compasses for the world of the 21st century. It does not mean that the side effects of the “bad” create a better world with no need for political action. Rather, it means that we have a different way of looking at climate change, thus creating an alternative for new forms of action (Beck, 2015b, p. 123).

Further reinforcing the topic of the “involuntary and unintended enlightening function” of disasters and social crises, Beck has observed that, nowadays, it is possible to see the very horrors and the terrifying ordeal of World War II as a historical change that marked a new era of cosmopolitism as well as the birth of many cosmopolitan institutions (Beck, 2016, p. 115). As Beck himself affirms, this last one is just an ex-post statement, that nevertheless indicates (in a paradoxical but telling manner) the relevant role of the unexpected in modern-age development, the winding road from past to future. Controversial as it may appear, the socio-political idea that a positive destiny could emerge and be induced by negative phenomena such as global environmental crises (that is, the sustainability-through-unsustainability dynamic) seems to have some theoretical and practical value. In order to better understand the rationale of emancipatory catastrophism, it could be useful to itemize its main characteristics:

  • A Change-or-Die Situation. Just like any other disaster, calamity, or tragedy, “climate change is pure ambivalence” (Beck, 2010, p. 258). Catastrophes are intrinsically Janus-like: the real threat of ending also creates opportunities of new beginnings; being backed into a corner, in a “change-or-die” situation, could be the most powerful trigger for action. Faced with catastrophes, people can actually change: “risk arrives as a threat, but it brings hope.” The palpable peril of witnessing a final global cataclysm is able to “create transnational public concerns, public awareness, and situations that demand immediate public action” (Beck, 2014, pp. 170–171). Moreover, sometimes it is easier to be reborn or rebuilt after some total ruin than to be gradually remodeled. A rising-from-the-ashes feeling can facilitate a fresh start.Footnote 5

  • Reaction Is Easier Than Action. Usually, the consequences of social actions are not limited to the area in which they were initially performed, since they also occur in interrelated fields originally ignored; “yet it is because these fields are in fact interrelated that the further consequences in adjacent areas tend to react upon the fundamental value-system. It is this usually unlooked-for reaction which constitutes a most important element in the process” (Merton, 1936, p. 903, italics added). In general, these reactions are not only important but also easier to come up with than autonomous projects planned from scratch: emancipatory catastrophism has an external driving force, an impulse from the outside represented by global environmental issues themselves, that can paradoxically benefit it in gaining momentum.

  • Collective Effervescence and Social Fatum. The final stage of global environmental crises implies that some sort of “anthropological shock” (Beck, 1987)—which could generate general emotional arousal and a stirring up of “collective effervescence”—might ensue (Durkheim, 1965, pp. 230–232). This might lead the community to come together and participate in the same action. Furthermore, as Beck argued, “the shared nature of the challenges posed by the threat of environmental crises could provide the glue to hold the West together” (2009, p. 65). The common will to cooperate can become part of each actor’s self-interest: “globally shared risk scenarios, we argue, give rise to the emergence of new cosmopolitan affiliations of risk” (Beck & Levy, 2013, p. 7), so that “a common interest in survival beyond borders can be constructed” (Beck, 2014, p. 176).

  • A Real Factuality. The reality of human-caused climate change is no longer a subject of debate, now appearing rather as a bona fide reality: the facts speak for themselves. This evidence-based and data-supported phenomenon of environmental crisis promises to have a strength that “no social movement, no political party, and certainly no sociological analysis, no matter how brilliant and well-founded, could ever have achieved” (Beck & Sznaider, 2010, p. 647), given that “even sociological theories do not permit human actors to anticipate their fate” (Turner, 1996, p. 178).Footnote 6 It is a sort of “naturally occurring” awareness-raising campaign, far stronger than usual ones, that might find its best advocate in its own enemy. The longer unsustainable practices continue, the greater will be the strength of constructive reactions.

  • A Self-Defeating Mechanism. “Risk is not catastrophe, but rather, the anticipation of future catastrophe in the present, as a horizon of the present future. The obsession with risk is to avoid catastrophe; the logic of global risk is one of self-destroying prophecies” (Beck, 2014, p. 170, italics added). To put it differently, the anticipation of catastrophes prompts changes in discourse and policy that could indeed prevent those catastrophes, meaning that “a successful dystopia aims at making itself obsolete: once the world it depicts is identified as a possible future, it seems to empower its readers again, restoring a ‘sense of possibilities’ that eventually makes alternative pathways thinkable” (Claisse & Delvennee, 2015, p. 2). A self-destroying prediction always involves voluntariness and deliberation: prediction’s “suicide” is a consequence of the renewed intentions of social actors, who modify some aspects of their behavior in response to the new awareness, preventing the prediction from happening. This new awareness, of course, is caused by the prediction itself—if social actors had not known about the forecasting of imminent crisis, the predicted scenario would not have been modified (Sabetta, 2019, pp. 55–56).

  • Sustainability and Beyond. “Ever since it has ceased to be disputed that the ongoing climate change is man-made and has catastrophic consequences for nature and society, the cards in society and politics have been dealt anew—worldwide. [Climate change] affords the opportunity of overcoming the nation-state narrowness of politics and of developing a cosmopolitan realpolitik” (Beck, 2010, p. 258, italics added). Hence, emancipatory catastrophism could go further than merely promoting a new politics of global sustainability, and might even lead to the point of questioning and reforming the entire society. It is not just a targeted therapy, since “the transformation of the unseen side effects of industrial production into global ecological flashpoints is not strictly a problem of the ‘environing’ world, it is not a so-called environmental problem, but instead a radical institutional crisis of the first (national) phase of industrial modernity” (Beck, 2009, p. 92). And this is perhaps emancipatory catastrophism’s greatest promise.

4 An Open-Ended Conclusion

Linking emancipatory catastrophism to unintended consequences, this chapter has provided some sociological motivations for defending the former. Our goal was to highlight the logical strength of Beck’s idea, whereby a quantity of remarkably desirable social phenomena may be triggered by the apotheosis of previous destructive developments. To quote again from his words: “When a qualitatively new social dynamic is produced by side effects, it is because several sets of unintended side effects, emanating from several different spheres of society, have all coalesced to produce a result none of them was aiming at, and which they might well have tried to stop if they’d had any inkling” (Beck & Willms, 2004, p. 194). The very notion of sustainability implies the existence of previous unsustainable human developments, overconsumption and environmental degradation, just as much as a transformative idea such as “degrowth” necessarily presupposes some unwise expansion and unreasonable rise that has gone before. For this reason, instead of just trying to avoid the “bad”, it is a matter of exploring and developing its constructive and paradoxical potential, its positive side-effects. The current unsustainability of our ecosystem could be working for future global sustainability. This perspective could mark “the beginning of a civilization that seeks to make the unforeseeable consequences of its own decisions foreseeable, and to subdue their unwanted side effects through conscious preventative action and institutional arrangements” (Id. 2004, p. 111).

However, even if climate change by no means leads directly and inevitably to the apocalypse, it might as well do so. Here’s the open-ended question: “between apocalyptic catastrophism and emancipatory catastrophism, which pathway to the future climate will humanity take?” (Asayama, 2015, p. 92). In fact, the devastating and fatal consequences of a final disaster cannot be underemphasized, since it surely has the potential to yield a series of accidents resulting in the extinction of human life (Mythen, 2004, pp. 19–20). Attempting to tackle this dilemma between apocalyptic and emancipatory (or cosmopolitanizing: see Levy, 2016) catastrophism is an extremely serious matter that deserves careful consideration. However, Beck’s concepts of “risk society” and “emancipatory catastrophism” do not mean that we are more at risk today than we were yesterday, but that unintended and unforeseen consequences are attached to social phenomena in a way that is more unpredictable than ever before. Hence, the shift from certainty about the production of risk-free objects to uncertainty about the dynamics, whose unintended effects threaten to disrupt all orderings and all plans (see Latour, 2004, p. 25). In this sense, it is even more serious (at least, from an analytical point of view) to place the concept of unintended consequences tout-court back at the center of sociological theory. In a real sense, the feasibility of this operation constitutes another open-ended issue.