Abstract
Many organizational decision problems may be usefully modeled as the programming problem:
subject to G(x) ≤ 0 where x ∈ ℝN, F: ℝN→ℝ, and G : ℝN→ℝK.
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Groves, T. (1976). Incentive Compatible Control of Decentralized Organizations. In: Ho, Y.C., Mitter, S.K. (eds) Directions in Large-Scale Systems. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-2259-7_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-2259-7_11
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