Abstract
In November 1996, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto announced a Big Bang policy to deregulate Japanese financial markets. Following a period of planning, implementation of the Big Bang began in April 1998 when all remaining restrictions on foreign exchange transactions were removed. It is scheduled to continue through March 2001. A listing of the deregulation agenda is dominated by measures to remove restrictions on how banks and securities firms do business and allow cross-entry of banks, securities firms, and insurers into each others’ businesses (Table 12.1).
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Gibson, M.S. (2000). Big Bang Deregulation and Japanese Corporate Governance: A Survey of the Issues. In: Hoshi, T., Patrick, H. (eds) Crisis and Change in the Japanese Financial System. Innovations in Financial Markets and Institutions, vol 12. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4395-4_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4395-4_12
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